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5INTRODUCTION: ONE EU, ONE NATO – 
ONE EUROPE?
SVEN BISCOP
When a doctor calls for a thorough examination of the state of a patient’s health,
he hopes that everything will turn out to be alright, but it really means that he
fears there is a serious problem. Likewise, when Herman Van Rompuy called for
the European Council of which he is the President to examine “the state of
defence in Europe”,1 he was asking for more than a routine check-up. In this
joint Egmont Paper, the Institute for European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit
Brussel and the Egmont Institute offer their diagnosis. In the opening essay,
Claudia Major and Christian Mölling cannot but conclude that “the state of
defence in Europe” is nearing the state of emergency. The “bonsai armies” that
they fear we will end up with are nice to look at – on the national day parade
for example – but not of much use.
In addition to the diagnosis though, we also want to propose a treatment. The
method of examination proposed by Van Rompuy already hints at an important
part of the cure. The fact is that we never examine “the state of defence in
Europe”. We assess the state of the EU’s CSDP, of NATO’s military posture, and
of course of each of our national armed forces. But we never assess Europe’s
military effort in its entirety. In fact, we are unable to, simply because there is
no forum where we set capability targets for “defence in Europe”.
On the one hand, we pretend that it is only a specific separable (and, in the
minds of many capitals, small) part of our armed forces that can be dedicated to
the CSDP and the achievement of its Headline Goal, the capacity to deploy up
to a corps of 60,000.2 That is of course a theoretical fiction: in reality any
commitment to either the CSDP or NATO or both has an impact on our entire
defence budget and our entire arsenal. A decision to invest in an air-to-air refu-
elling project through the European Defence Agency for example implies that
that sum cannot be spent in another capability area of importance for the CSDP
or NATO or, usually, both, whereas once delivered the resulting air-to-air refu-
elling capability will be available for operations in either framework. Schemes
to encourage states to join capability efforts, like the EU’s Pooling & Sharing
1. In his speech at the annual conference of the European Defence Agency on 22 March 2013; see http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/136394.pdf.
2. For many Member States it is, apparently, such a small part of their forces that they seem to equate the
CSDP with the Battlegroups and have all but forgotten the Headline Goal. They also tend to forget that a
Battlegroup is pretty much the numbers that the Brussels police will deploy during the actual European
Council – hardly a level of ambition worthy of a continent.
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and NATO’s Smart Defence, obviously can only make the most of opportunities
to generate synergies and effects of scale if all arsenals are taken into the balance
in their entirety. On the other hand, the NATO Defence Planning Process
(NDPP) supposedly does encompass (nearly) the whole of our forces, but it sets
targets for individual nations in function of the targets of the Alliance as a
whole, and does not separately define the level of ambition of NATO’s European
pillar even though it becomes increasingly likely that the European Allies will
have to act alone.
We are thus confronted with a curious situation. In political terms it continually
is “Europe” that we refer to and expect to act. Even the US has sent a clear
message to “Europe” that it should assume responsibility for the security of its
own periphery and initiate the response to crises. “Europe” for Washington can
mean the European Allies acting through NATO, or the EU acting through the
CSDP, or an ad hoc coalition of European states. Washington really no longer
cares under which “European” flag we act, as long as we act and the problem
is dealt with without extensive American assets being drawn in. As Luis Simón
points out in his essay, the US is ‘geared towards figuring out how to get the
most “bang” out of a “low cost” and “light footprint” approach to European
security’. In terms of defence planning however, “Europe” does not exist. If he
succeeds, Van Rompuy is to be congratulated for bringing it into being.
Defining Europe
A call to look at “the state of defence in Europe” thus implicitly is a call to define
a level of ambition for “Europe”, against which the existing capabilities can be
assessed, shortfalls identified, and priority objectives defined. As the High
Representative, Catherine Ashton, states at the outset of her Final Report
Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence, this
‘warrant[s] a strategic debate among Heads of State and Government. Such a
debate at the top level must set priorities’.3 Put differently, the key political ques-
tion that the European Council needs to address, before it can address any mili-
tary-technical question, is for which types of contingencies in which parts of the
world “Europe”, as a matter of priority, commits to assume responsibility, and
which capabilities it commits to that end. On the basis of the answer to that
question all other dimensions of the European Council’s broad defence agenda
can be tackled – absent that answer, Europe’s defence effort will still be left
hanging in the air. It is often said for example that “Europe” needs its own
strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refuelling and ISTAR. But to be able to do
what? Air-policing in the Baltic? Air-to-ground campaigns in the Mediterra-
3. Of 15 October 2013; see http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf.
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nean? Or even further afield? And at which scale? Without an answer to such
questions, it is impossible to design a sensible capability mix and decide on
priority capability projects.
Yet, who is “Europe”? Who can define the level of ambition that serves as polit-
ical guidance for operations undertaken and capabilities developed by Euro-
peans through both NATO and the CSDP? Again, we are facing the same
problem that there is today no institutionalised venue where Europeans can take
decisions about their posture in NATO and the CSDP simultaneously – it is
always either/or. Under these circumstances, the European Council is the best
option. It is of course an EU body, but they are our Heads of State and Govern-
ment, meeting in an intergovernmental setting, adopting not binding law but
political declarations, and that by unanimity. Surely they, if anybody, have the
legitimacy to declare that they will consider the political guidance which they
agree upon to guide their governments’ positions in both NATO and the CSDP?
Politically, “Europe” can either mean each and every European state, or an ad
hoc coalition of some of these states, or, when they make foreign and security
policy together (which alas they do not do systematically enough), the EU. In
political terms, “Europe” neither means the CSDP nor NATO: these are instru-
ments, at the service of the makers of foreign and security policy. Instruments,
moreover, both of which “Europe” is more likely to use in the near future than
the US, in view of the “pivot” of its strategic focus to Asia. If Washington no
longer takes the lead in setting strategy towards Europe’s neighbourhood, the
only alternative actor is Europeans collectively, i.e. the EU (for individually, no
European state can defend all of its interests all of the time). The European
Council thus really is the best placed to address “the state of defence in Europe”.
This does not in any way prejudice how, in a real-life contingency, “Europe” will
undertake action: using NATO, the CSDP, other EU instruments, the UN, ad
hoc coalitions or a combination thereof. Indeed, if action entails larger-scale
combat operations, “Europe” will need the NATO command & control struc-
ture, which is its main asset. According to Jamie Shea, ‘NATO’s choice, there-
fore, will be to focus on high-end operations built essentially around a conven-
tional military core structure and organised through an integrated command
system’. The best way to make sure that all instruments are put to use in an
integrated way, from the planning of any type of action to the post-action and
long-term involvement, is to politically put any intervention under the aegis of
the EU, even when acting under national or NATO command in the case of
military involvement. The fact is that in almost every scenario, the European
Commission and the EEAS will either from the start or eventually have to take
charge of the political, economic and social dimension, regardless of how we
address the military dimension – better to integrate all from the beginning there-
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fore under the political aegis of the Union. Furthermore, that flag still is much
less controversial whereas there always are countries and regions in which it is
advised not to operate under specific national flags or the NATO-label.
In this context, creative use of Art. 44 of the Treaty on European Union, which
is mentioned in passing in the High Representative’s report and is highlighted by
Margriet Drent, can provide a flexible way of circumventing the political diffi-
culties that continue to be an obstacle to effective coordination between NATO
and the EU (or between individual Member States and the EU) for operations
outside the CSDP-framework. Art. 44 allows the Council to entrust the imple-
mentation of an operation to a group of Member States. When a Member State
or a coalition initiates an operation using a national or the NATO command
structure, the Council could retroactively recognise it as a task ‘to protect the
Union’s values and serve its interests’ (Art. 42.5), thus placing it within the polit-
ical aegis of the EU, but without detracting from the command & control exer-
cised by the Member States involved, except that they commit to ‘keep the
Council regularly informed of [the operation’s] progress’ (Art 44.2). The advan-
tages would be manifold. The military dimension of an intervention can be fully
integrated from the start with the political, economic and social dimension of
which the EU is best placed to take charge (as opposed to the Libyan case, when
the EU put itself out of the game and only came back in at a much later stage).
The EU guise will do a lot to alleviate any suspicions of hidden national or
NATO/American agendas. And the Berlin Plus mechanism, which has proved
far too rigid to use effectively and ‘was never designed for allowing rapid
response’ (Alexander Mattelaer and Jo Coelmont), can be avoided. In any case
‘the need for both institutions to become more self-reliant and less dependent on
the United States’ is evident, as Jamie Shea stresses.
Defining Europe’s Ambition
That leaves the question: what are the priorities for Europe as a security
provider? Ashton’s report puts the emphasis on the broader neighbourhood,
including the Sahel and the Horn, to which certainly the Gulf should be added,
as well as the “Wider North”, where “the EU until now remains merely an
observer” (James Rogers). This is where “strategic autonomy must materialise
first”: a bold statement which the European Council can render more explicit,
for what exactly it wanted to achieve in its neighbourhood “has hitherto
remained rather vague” (Margarita Šešelgytơ). This is where Europe commits to
take the lead in maintaining peace and security, i.e. to initiate the necessary
response to security problems, including prevention, as well as intervention,
with partners if possible but alone if necessary. Further on the report refers to
the soon to be adopted Maritime Security Strategy, which should of course be
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integrated in the priorities. Should contributing to the collective security system
of the UN not be a priority too, in line with the EU’s commitment to “effective
multilateralism”? All three priorities go hand in hand. ‘Pivoting to Asia
[ourselves] without strengthening our position in our immediate neighbourhood
would be reckless and dangerous’, Jonathan Holslag states, but Luis Simón
equally rightly points out that ‘to confine [ourselves] to a defensive mind-set and
a “neighbourhood-only” approach’ would be ‘a fatal mistake’.
The next step is one that is curiously absent from the debate: to translate these
priorities into a military level of ambition. Which capabilities are we willing to
commit? How many troops do we want to be able to deploy and which perma-
nent strategic reserve do we want to maintain? Which strategic enablers does
this require? First, Europe needs a permanent strategic reserve: the ability to
mount a decisive air campaign and to deploy up to an army corps, as a single
force if necessary, for combat operations in Europe’s broader neighbourhood,
over and above all on-going operations. This de facto “double Headline Goal”
may seem fanciful, but it is but the reflection of the rate of deployment of the
last decade. Second, it needs maritime power: the ability to achieve command of
the sea in the broader neighbourhood, while maintaining a global naval pres-
ence in order to permanently engage with partners, notably in Asia and the
Arctic. Finally, in the “post-pivot” era it needs regional strategic autonomy:
acquiring all strategic enablers, including air and maritime transport, air-to-air
refuelling, and ISTAR, to allow for major army, air and naval operations in the
broader neighbourhood without reliance on American assets.
This is the nature of the decisions that need to be taken and can then in turn be
elaborated in the ‘strategic level Defence Roadmap, approved by the European
Council, setting out specific targets and timelines’ that Ashton calls for – which,
in addition, should include a budget as well. Based on a re-defined level of ambi-
tion, the Defence Roadmap will ipso facto provide the starting point for the
update of the EDA’s Capability Development Plan (expected by the autumn of
2014), as well as the “overarching framework” for the various regional and
functional clusters that Ashton further recommends. The targets that Europe
collectively sets itself in this Roadmap can then be incorporated as such, as an
additional level, in the NDPP. Since we cannot ‘continue to rely on the US to
plug all gaping holes in [our] defence posture’, such a “parallel planning cycle”
is a necessity, Alexander Mattelaer and Jo Coelmont stress. ‘Joint defence plan-
ning among partners’ is indeed ‘the added value of genuine Pooling and Sharing
[emphasis added]’ as they emphasise in their second essay.
The stark reality is though that until now most of the time most states make but
paper commitments to NATO and the CSDP both and that neither the NDPP
nor the Headline Goal has much impact on national defence. This is why Ashton
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is right to also call for a ‘robust follow-up process’, including perhaps a “Euro-
pean semester on defence”. Without guarantees that notably budgets allocated
to collective capability projects will not be affected by future national budget
cuts, the level of trust necessary to launch such projects in the first place cannot
be achieved. At the same time, ‘it is perhaps necessary to think of other possible
avenues for defence-relevant financing’, such as the European Investment Bank,
as Daniel Fiott creatively proposes. ‘Equally significant is the [Commission’s]
proposal for EU-owned dual use capabilities’,4 adds Margriet Drent, which
Member States would do well not to discard too easily – money should trump
turf wars.
A robust ambition requires robust follow-up. The December 2013 European
Council will surely not satisfy all expectations, which are very great – but then
the challenge is great too. The European Council has already generated a new
dynamic in the debate, including on ideas and notions which hitherto were not
part of the official discussion. We hope that our collection of essays can be a
useful contribution – and we definitely promise that we will provide robust
follow-up too.
4. In its July 2013 Communication A New Deal for European Defence. Towards a More Competititve
and Efficient Defence and Security Sector. COM(2013)542/2; see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/
defence/files/communication_defence_en.pdf.
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THE DEPENDENT STATE(S) OF EUROPE:
EUROPEAN DEFENCE IN YEAR FIVE OF AUSTERITY
CLAUDIA MAJOR & CHRISTIAN MÖLLING
In 2009, Europe’s fiscal crisis hit the already long existing European defence
decadence, i.e. the unwillingness of most EU Member States to generate appro-
priate portions of capability for defence. These two developments melted into a
new paradigm: the defence economic imperative. It means that the decisions that
Europeans take on military capabilities are less an expression of their long-term
strategic priorities but one of immediate budget restrictions. We coined the term
“Bonsai Armies” to grasp a dwindling European military might inherent in this
development, which results in tiny, pretty and complete, but eventually inca-
pable armies. Looking at the current state of European defence, we fear that the
Member States may have misunderstood our concept: this was meant as a
warning, not as a blue print.
The State of Defence Austerity
Defence budget squeeze: shrinking and divergence
There are two long-term repercussions of austerity for the defence budgets of
European states: first, defence expenditures in Europe are dwindling, and will
continue to do so. Member States continue painting positive budget futures, yet,
the effects of the fiscal crisis will continue to impact for another decade or so.
Moreover, inflation will turn into a net loss of buying power for what currently
looks (only) like stagnation. Budget estimates arrive at a decrease (2011-2020)
from ¼220 to ¼195 to ¼147 billion (11-33%).
Second, divergence is growing among the Europeans. Behind the overall budget
squeeze hides an increasing imbalance. As some budgets are more affected by
cuts than others, also the individual contributions to European defence change.
The result is a growing divide among Member States: within the 2008-2013
timeframe defence spending diverged among Member States between a 40%
increase and a 40% decrease. Moreover, the imbalance has a regional flavour:
the cuts are heavier in the East than in the West.
THE STATE OF DEFENCE IN EUROPE: STATE OF EMERGENCY?
14
Military dimension: heading towards more dependence
Every additional per cent of cuts brings EU states closer to a red line from
whereon military forces and equipment cannot form a relevant capability. This
is especially because Member States shrink the size of their armies but do not
increase their efficiencies. With their current activities, states accelerate
achieving what they fear most, that is, dependence. To be able to intervene mili-
tarily European states are becoming more dependent on each other than they
have ever been before.
Beyond some spectacular cuts, the budget pressure is continuously breaking
small bricks out of the wall of European defence. Because there is no concept for
military burden-sharing that would frame these developments, every state
chooses to specialise individually in the area it can afford – but not in what is
needed to stay capable as Europe. Expensive capabilities like aircrafts, helicop-
ters and satellites are likely to become less and less available for all. The uncon-
trolled cutting of military capabilities also reduces the possibilities of coopera-
tion. It creates more collective capability gaps (e.g. RPASs) but at the same time
keeps often outdated surplus material in other areas (such as tanks).
These mosaic stones of the individual changes in Europe eventually result in an
overall picture according to which the Member States have significantly lowered
their willingness and/or ability to deploy and sustain military forces. The levels
of ambition shrunk by roughly 25% between 2008-2013.
Shrinking forces mean fewer operations. Yet, more importantly, changes in
quality reduce the ability to conduct complex operations: brigade formations
are key to those operations as they provide the necessary backbone – Command
and Control frameworks with the associated enablers. Their availability is
shrinking from 20 to 15 and fewer countries hold them. As less and less smaller
states can deploy on their own, they become ever more dependent on those few
who can still provide the operational framework they can plug-in to.
Industrial dimension: non-European lifelines
While the austerity measures of governments have already affected industries,
the more serious impact is still to come: European countries will soon have
significantly less programmes and equipment – hence less earnings for industries
through production and services, and more overcapacities. This is the outcome
of the tension between ongoing nationalist political approaches to the defence
industry and the inevitably growing globalisation of this business. Industries
react to this by reducing their share of defence business, or by transferring it
outside Europe through exports. These have become a lifeline for the defence
industry. Key components, technologies and raw materials have to be imported
from outside Europe.
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Hence, rather than enjoying strategic autonomy, European armed forces have to
live with non-European dependencies in their supply lines. These dependencies
are likely to increase: the EDTIB may further shrink, since the domestic consol-
idation into national champions, which some states favour, prevents a further
Europeanisation.
Political dimension: the growing gap puts defence solidarity and 
policy at risk
While militarily the defence crisis increases the dependence between the Member
States, it deeply divides them politically. Because of national risk perspectives,
but also the style and size of cuts in budget, equipment and personnel differ
considerably among the Member States, the latter are less and less able (and
willing) to define and implement a common defence policy within the EU frame-
work. The increasing inability or unwillingness of some states to contribute to
joint operations reduces interoperability and expands the inner-European capa-
bility and modernisation gap. Vice versa, contributions can only come from the
shrinking group of willing and capable EU members. This creates centrifugal
dynamics: those who no longer contribute do not subscribe to common policies
because they cannot shape it – those who still contribute are not interested in
giving “free riders” a say in where and how to implement policies.
Defence cooperation: doing something instead of doing the right 
thing
Member States have devoted a considerable amount of rhetoric to defence coop-
eration and launched several processes to serve it. This applies especially to
political frameworks like Weimar or Visegrad. Yet, tangible results tend to result
from shared military interests, and not from political declarations. Successful
projects like Air-to-Air Refuelling do not reflect a common effort to improve
collective capabilities for defence but rather the highest common denominator
among national interests. Such smallest possible, yet necessary, islands of coop-
eration for a single equipment area are not adequate for the quality of the prob-
lems – because the latter are structural and exist across the whole system of
capabilities. Instead, this current patchwork without a framework risks wasting
resources and duplicating efforts, while maintaining gaps.
Sovereignty – Which Future to Manage Dependencies?
Austerity increases intra-European defence dependence. Yet, the conception of
sovereignty that Member States still maintain does not allow them to recognise
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these dependencies and thus hinders the Europeans to manage them. Sover-
eignty is for most Member States not about being capable of acting effectively
in order to solve problems of their societies. Rather, it means staying master of
the final decision, even if this prevents or diminishes the development of a (Euro-
pean) capability that could engage with their own problems. Hence, Member
States prefer autonomy over capability. By doing so, whether consciously or not,
Member States actually pretend to be individually able to deal with security
risks and threats and keep those away from their territory, people and political
system.
It is thus only logical that with such a conception of sovereignty in mind, EU
members avoid talking about and engaging in cooperation and specialisation.
Accepting specialisation would mean acknowledging that they can no longer
assure the national core of defence tasks alone. Recognising cooperation inflicts
similar headaches: governments would have to admit that their ability to decide
and act in security policy does not carry enough weight in view of current secu-
rity problems.
Yet, states also insist on their individual right to decide because, they argue, they
cannot entirely trust their partners: they fear being left alone in an operation
because a partner decides to withdraw; not being able to engage in an operation,
as a partner with important capabilities decides not to participate; and giving
others, who do not make any contributions of their own to security, the oppor-
tunity to free ride.
However, over 20 years of experience in NATO- and EU-operations invalidates
the fear of these traps: sharing has been a daily business from Bosnia to Afghan-
istan and Libya, and NATO and the EU have gathered experience in managing
the political and military caveats. No state would have been able to carry out
these operations alone. Moreover, European states have made themselves
dependent on defence industries and defence contractors: states place their
sovereignty in the hands of actors that do it for profit, but they do not trust
partners that agree on a common objective?
Thus, states have locked themselves into a vicious circle: their clinging to
national prerogatives eventually increases their dependence upon partners while
also diminishing their military capacity to act. Member States have not been
able to prevent capabilities from getting ever more critical, such as by increasing
cooperation. Individual defence planning and cuts further the dependency.
While states are rhetorically adhering to military autonomy, reality is catching
up in that specialisation is already taking place in an uncontrolled way and
further increases dependency. Already today European states are more
dependent on each other than they have ever been before when it comes to mili-
tary interventions, as demonstrated in 2011 in Libya, and again in 2013 in Mali.
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Sovereignty is thus the crucial element: the way European governments will
conceive it will decide the future of European defence. Put differently, the future
of European defence depends on whether the Europeans are able to develop an
understanding of sovereignty that enables them to compromise on autonomy in
order to manage their dependencies. Four scenarios are possible:
1. The silent death of European defence will be the consequence if Europeans
continue to neglect the dependence. The defence sector would see a decreas-
ing effectiveness, i.e. the need for more investments. Member States would
allow only for ad hoc cooperation. It would only take place if and as long as
this is the only way to maintain a national capability.
2. A return to the 19thcentury: the current re-nationalisation of security policies
points to the risk that EU states may increase these dependencies. Govern-
ments could be tempted to “sanctuarise” independence and make it the pri-
mary objective of their defence policies. Even if the governments carry on
denying interdependence, defence problems will certainly not shrink to a size
that national armies can manage them alone. However, military action
would immediately become more difficult to organise, or even impossible.
3. Towards a European Army: the other extreme would be to institutionalise
dependence by transferring sovereignty to the EU. It would enable a Euro-
pean army type organisation of the European military forces to take place.
Such a development would certainly be the most efficient way of organising
defence. Yet, it is highly unlikely to materialise, for the required common
political vision is missing and is not likely to arrive any time soon.
4. Pooling of sovereignty: a more pragmatic approach to sovereignty would
become possible if Member States would not have to agree on what to pro-
tect and where to use armed forces. Instead they would consent on the key
notion of sovereignty as the following: to stay capable of problem-solving
action by pursuing common political objectives. In order to regain sover-
eignty under the condition of dependency they would pool their problem-
solving capabilities. Dependencies like responsibilities and access to capabil-
ities would become organised through treaties. These arrangements would
build on examples from two decades of operations – in which sovereignty
management has been daily business. States can still pursue national levels of
ambitions on top.
The December Council: Decision Time rather than 
Christmas Gifts
The 2013 EU defence summit will most likely not debate the crucial “sover-
eignty – dependency” conundrum. Yet, its decisions will impact upon it. The
only issue that the Heads of State and Government may accept to debate are
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probably capabilities. They should hence take it as a starting point. They should
launch a European Defence Review, i.e. a capability assessment. It would first
comprise an overview over what capabilities Europe has today and what will be
available in 10 years’ time. This would point out the current and future defence
choices Europe has to make.
The second part of this assessment of choices would be to offer four ways of
organising capabilities, beginning with national autonomy via the status quo,
pooling of sovereignty to a European Army. Member States can take a progres-
sive perspective and discuss how to increase efficiencies, instead of moaning
about loss and dependence. The benchmark to measure the output that each
option would deliver could be the EU Headline Goals, or recent operations like
Libya (2011).
In parallel to this, Member States may have to find a way to tell their people that
there is no defence Santa Claus anywhere near: their national armies cannot
seriously fight without the help of others. The challenge is to communicate such
a message within a broader vision of European defence, and a vision that the
majority of people and particularly the younger generation understand and
support: the reason why Europe needs security and defence lies in Europe itself
– it is Europe as a political and social environment; its a way of life that is worth
protecting. This security at home depends on activities abroad. Military means
are not the only instrument at hand. Yet, they might be in the first line in order
to avoid that risks materialise or arrive on European soil.
Governments may still have a Christmas gift: when their people tell them that
they already knew that they were dependent on others, but they did not want to
shock their governments by confronting them with the truth.
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AMERICA’S ASIAN “REBALANCING” AND THE FUTURE
OF EUROPE
LUIS SIMÓN
The assumption that the US strategic “rebalancing” or “pivot” to Asia will force
Europeans to take their security and that of their immediate neighbourhood
more seriously has become the running theme of the forthcoming European
Council on defence. By outlining the links between America’s evolving defence
strategy, the transatlantic relationship and Europe, this contribution seeks to
place that assumption in perspective. Not only does the transatlantic relation-
ship remain important to ensuring Europe’s strategic cohesion and the stability
of the broader European neighbourhood. Critically, the very success of the
transatlantic relationship will largely depend on the ability of Europeans to
think and act beyond its neighbourhood.
US Defence Strategy: Way Forward and Challenges Ahead
The Pentagon’s 2014 QDR will be a momentous one. It will have to weave
together a number of hard-hitting strategic, political, technological and indus-
trial themes. The expected withdrawal of most American and allied combat
troops from Afghanistan in late 2014 will signal the declining centrality of the
“War on Terror”, a paradigm that has had a pervasive influence over the foreign
and defence policies of the US for well over a decade.
2014 will mark the emergence of a new paradigm, increasingly organised
around the so-called ‘rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific’ region broadcasted
by the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance.5 It will fall onto the forthcoming QDR
to spell out what the Asian rebalancing means in terms of force posture, struc-
ture, capability planning and, critically, how it will translate into the DoD’s
budget. Much of this debate will be about how new technologies and concepts
can help meet China’s “asymmetrical” challenge including, chiefly, its progress
in the areas of A2/AD and its offensive cyber warfare capabilities. Presumably,
this process shall help further animate an already undergoing trend towards
long-range strike and stealthy air and undersea systems, directed energy
weapons or cyber security.
5. US Department of Defence, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence.
Washington DC, DoD, January 2012.
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Another key challenge for the 2014 QDR will be to offer a blue print for US
force posture and defence strategy in Central Asia post-2014. Arguments for a
full military withdrawal from Afghanistan and a broader strategic retreat from
Central and South Asia seem to be winning the day. However, some sort of
follow-on Western military and security presence in Afghanistan will be critical
to ensuring that country’s stability and consolidating the progress made after
more than a decade of sustained investments and efforts. The security of the
broader region remains linked to the evolution of Afghanistan. And a commit-
ment to that country’s security shall have a positive effect upon the stability of
other Central Asian republics and of America’s relations with those countries.
Despite its traditional association with the War on Terror, the increasing inter-
dependence between Asia’s maritime and continental environments makes
Central (and South) Asia relevant from the perspective of the strategic rebal-
ancing or “pivot”.6
The need to strike the right balance in Asia’s maritime and continental “thea-
tres” is further complicated by ongoing instability across the Middle East, from
Mali to Iran, through Libya and Syria. Critically, all these challenges will have
to be tackled while the Pentagon is hit by sequestration and grapples with a
constraining budgetary environment. With such a menu of big-ticket items on
the table, one might legitimately wonder whether Washington will have any
bandwidth left to think about Europe. However, the future of Europe and the
evolution of the transatlantic relationship will have implications upon every
single one of those big-ticket items and will therefore continue to be of great
importance for the US.
The “Rebalancing” in Context: How Europe and the 
Middle East Still Matter
Guarded by the world’s two greatest oceans and surrounded by weak and
friendly neighbours, America’s security depends largely on its ability to project
power beyond its shores. Its advantageous geopolitical position and maritime
nature give the US the kind of strategic flexibility to think of and treat the Eura-
sian landmass (and the world) as an integrated geopolitical unit.7 American stra-
tegic thinkers have traditionally attached special importance to the US being
able to project strategic power to the most economically dynamic areas of the
Eurasian “rimland”, namely the European peninsula, the Persian Gulf and East
6. Simón, L. (2013) “Reaching Beyond the Indo-Pacific”, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 32, No. 4: pp. 331-
353; Montgomery, E.B. (2013) “Competitive Strategies against Continental Powers: The Geopolitics of
Sino-Indian-American Relations”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1: pp. 76-100.
7. Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives
(New York, Basic Books).
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Asia.8 By making clear that the Asian rebalancing must not compromise America’s
global reach, the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance embraces such a premise.9
Maintaining strategic access to Europe and the Middle East remains of great
importance for America.10 Both regions are vital to the economic wellbeing of
the US and the (US-led) international economic and monetary system. The US-
EU economic relationship is the world’s largest, accounting for one third of total
goods and services trade and nearly half of global economic output. Total US
investment in the EU is three times higher than in all of Asia; while EU invest-
ment in the US is around eight times the amount of EU investment in India and
China together.11 The ongoing negotiations on a TTIP promise to further exploit
the untapped potential of the transatlantic relationship. And they also bear
testament to America’s recognition that its growing Pacific responsibilities
cannot come at the expense of its duties as an Atlantic power. The Atlantic and
Pacific are as interwoven as they have ever been at the level of US geostrategy,
which remains global in nature.12
Its increasing energy self-reliance may well be reducing America’s direct depend-
ence on the Middle East. However, the global nature of the oil market and the
effect of supply insecurity in other major markets to which the US is wedded
means Washington will for many years remain committed to promoting stability
in that region.13 Not least, US operational engagement in places like Libya
(2011) or Mali (2012) and the demands on the Pentagon to maintain high read-
iness with a view to intervening in contingencies in Syria or Iran underscore the
ongoing importance of the Middle East and call into question the ability to
implement swiftly a strategic pivot to Asia.
Moreover, recent developments such as the attack on the US Embassy in Beng-
hazi in September 2012 highlight the limitations of a light footprint. All in all,
these developments point to the ongoing strategic relevance of the Middle East
for the US. And the Middle East itself underscores the ongoing importance of
Europe, for those two regions are very much interdependent in the US strategic
mindset. Aside from offering reliable and close bases for deployments into the
Middle East, political and operational support from European allies is a key
asset for US influence in that region. The 2011 intervention in Libya stands as a
powerful illustration of that fact.
8. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2013) “Future of the Army: The Rise of China and the Decline of the US Army”, US
Army War College Strategy Conference, 10 April 2013.
9. US Department of Defence, op. cit, p. 2. See also Flournoy, M. and Davidson, J. (2012) “Obama’s New
Global Posture”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4: pp. 54-63.
10. Admiral James Stavridis, Testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, 2013, p. 5.
11. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/united-states/; http://www.ustr.gov/
countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union.
12. Multiple interviews with US foreign policy and defence officials, Washington DC (January-September
2013).
13. Mead, W.R. (2012) “America is Stuck with the Mideast”, The Wall Street Journal, 7 March 2012.
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Europe also matters by virtue of its political, economic and cultural closeness to
the US. That Europe is a stable and peaceful place and Europeans are capable of
taking care of their own security have become all too familiar mantras. If taken
at face value, these contentions seem perfectly logical. The problem, however, is
that the main European powers differ as to how to organise the security of
Europe and that of its neighbourhood. Should the US leave Europe, any
attempts by Europeans to regain the security initiative in and around Europe are
likely to result in uncoordinated and incoherent responses. And this could
further animate instability in Europe’s neighbourhood and, potentially, in
Europe itself. US forward engagement has been largely responsible for
upholding that continent’s cohesion in the first place.14 Assuming that the
economic, political and legal structures that US/NATO military power helped
build in and around Europe – and the stability that sprang from them – could
be safely decoupled from such power could turn out to be very damaging to US
interests – and indeed to the interests of all the NATO allies.
The Transatlantic Relationship and the Asian 
“Rebalancing”
Beyond the strategic importance that Europe and its neighbourhood bear for the
US, European allies can also play an important contribution to Asian security.
European allies comprised over 90% of non-US military forces in NATO’s ISAF
in Afghanistan.15 Additionally, they have for well over a decade contributed
substantial development aid, economic and diplomatic resources – and engaged
in police training in that country. As the US ponders over what kind of commit-
ment it will maintain in Afghanistan, a number of European allies have already
pledged their willingness to continue to contribute to Afghanistan’s stability and
development with troops, money and ongoing diplomatic engagement.
European doings in Afghanistan must be read alongside bilateral and EU-led
initiatives to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties to other Central Asian
republics and develop an integrated strategy for the region. Europeans have a
strategic interest in promoting stability and economic development in Central
Asia, a region they see as important in their efforts to diversify their energy
supplies. In wanting to assist the autonomy of Afghanistan and other Central
Asian Republics and foster economic integration and political cooperation in
the region, Europeans share an interest with the US. Success in that endeavour
14. Yost, D.S. (2002) “Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe”, International Affairs, Vol. 78, No.
2: pp. 277-300.
15. Stavridis, op. cit., 2013, p. 2.
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would come a long way in helping mitigate those countries’ excessive depend-
ence on Russia or China.
Beyond Afghanistan and Central Asia, their diplomatic weight and their naval
and technological potential means there are a number of ways in which Euro-
peans can contribute to the stability of Asia’s maritime environments and to the
advancement of US strategic interests alongside the Indo-Pacific axis. These
range from educational exchanges, joint training and exercising, weapons trans-
fers through contributions to maritime security.16 Secretary Panetta’s farewell
speech in London, in which he publicly urged Europeans to ‘join the US in its
pivot to Asia’, is an example of Washington’s increasing recognition of this
fact.17 In the words of former EUCOM chief Admiral Stavridis, ‘Europe is today
a security exporter, possessing among the most highly trained and technologi-
cally advanced militaries in the world’.18
All in all, America’s considerations about force posture and defence strategy in
Europe and its expectations as to the future of the transatlantic relationship are
organised around three broad themes of objectives: defending the European
allies against emerging external strategic challenges (i.e. ballistic missiles or
cyber-attacks) and insuring them against the re-emergence of geopolitical
competition alongside Europe’s eastern flank; projecting US and allied power
into the European periphery (i.e. the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Ocean and
the Arctic); and stimulating European allies to contribute to America’s global
geostrategic objectives, including in Asia.
What Future for America’s Presence in Europe?19
The driving trend in US force posture and defence strategy in Europe is one of
drawdown. Mounting pressures elsewhere oblige. But that does not mean the
US will leave Europe. Insofar as it continues to have a key stake in the security
of that continent and in the future of the transatlantic relationship, Washington
will try to remain the chief guardian of European security and the leader of the
transatlantic relationship.
US force posture and defense strategy are presently aimed at getting the most
influence out of a light foot-print. In fact, the last few years have presided over
a small but potentially significant reintroduction of US military assets and a
16. See also Holmes, J.R. (2012) “How Europe Can Support the Pivot to Asia”, The Diplomat, 9 July
2012. See also Rogers, J. (2009) From Suez to Shanghai: The European Union and Eurasian Maritime
Security. Occasional Paper No. 77 (Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies).
17. US Department of Defence, Remarks by Secretary Panetta at King’s College London, 18 January
2013.
18. Stavridis, op. cit., 2013, p. 5.
19. The present section draws on and summarizes a forthcoming article in the journal Survival.
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reinvigoration of US military initiatives in Europe. The European BMD archi-
tecture has led the way, having resulted in the deployment of a radar in Turkey,
interceptors in Romania and Poland and, critically, four mobile Aegis destroyers
in Rota (Spain).
Beyond BMD, other recent developments include the US deployment of Patriot
missile batteries and the setting up of an Aviation Detachment in Poland;
NATO’s drawing up of contingency plans to defend the Baltic States, at the US’
insistence; the pick up in the pattern of multilateral training and exercising in
the Baltic-Nordic space; America’s contribution to the policing of the Baltic air-
space; a growing emphasis on bilateral strategic ties with Norway, perceived in
the US as the European gateway to the Arctic region; the deployment of US and
allied Patriot batteries to Turkey; several US bilateral and NATO-wide initia-
tives in the area of cyber-security; a renewed emphasis on transatlantic training
and interoperability; a consolidation of US posture in southern Europe, accom-
panied by greater emphasis on amphibious and special operation assets; and a
reinvigoration of strategic ties to those European allies most able to project stra-
tegic power beyond Europe, particularly Britain and France.
America’s evolving force posture and defense strategy in Europe reveal impor-
tant adaptations to an evolving strategic context. Three main trends are worth
pointing out. The first is an evolution from “presence” to “engagement”, illus-
trated by the growing emphasis on initiatives such as cyber-defence, BMD or
training, all of which are less demanding in terms of direct US military presence.
The second is the shift from a land-centred posture concentrated in Central
Europe to a lighter and more flexible one.
The third, and potentially the most important one, is the increasing compart-
mentalisation of Washington’s strategic relations and partnerships in Europe, as
the US leans on different European countries and sub-regional groupings for
different security tasks and initiatives. This evolution relates to the resurfacing
of bilateralism and sub-regional defence cooperation initiatives, such as the
British-French defence agreements, Nordic Defence Cooperation or Central
European Defence Cooperation. It also speaks to a broader geopolitical
tendency, namely the fact that Europe and its neighbourhood are increasingly
defined by a less hierarchical strategic order, one that will be more fluid and
unstable than Europeans have grown accustomed to.20
20. Simón, L. and Rogers, J. (2010) “The Return of European Geopolitics? All Roads Lead Through Lon-
don”, RUSI Journal, Vol. 155, No. 3: pp. 58-64.
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Conclusion
For well over seven decades, US forward presence and a strong transatlantic
relationship have created the necessary conditions for European economic inte-
gration and political and security cooperation. Today, the strategic rise of Asia
throws up a question mark over America’s presence in Europe and over the
future of the transatlantic relationship. While the US is unlikely to abandon
Europe to its own luck, its increasing strategic interest in Asia will unavoidably
result in less attention towards Europe and its surroundings. That does create a
demand for greater European efforts in the realm of security. However, there is
a risk that Europeans will confound this situation and embrace an alleged “US
departure” as an opportunity to confine themselves to a defensive mind-set and
a “neighbourhood-only” approach to security. That would prove to be a fatal
mistake.
As important as ensuring a balance of power in Europe was, the levels of secu-
rity and prosperity Europeans have conquered since the end of the Second World
War are ultimately explained by the fact that Western strategic, political and
economic primacy was global in nature. Thus, while the transatlantic relation-
ship continues to offer the most reliable framework to ensure strategic cohesion
in and around Europe, the survival of the transatlantic relationship will largely
depend on the ability of Europeans to join forces with the US to provide security
beyond their immediate vicinity. In a world characterised by a relative transfer
of wealth and power from west to east, this shall prove the ultimate test of the
West’s resilience – and of Europe’s own future.
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NATO POST-2014: PRESERVING THE ESSENTIALS
JAMIE SHEA
Until the Cold War came to an end in 1990, NATO could be described as a
“homeland defence” organisation. Its forces were stationed inside its borders,
pointing outwards to parry incoming conventional armies. After it began to
engage in the Former Yugoslavia, however, NATO changed into an organisation
that projected forces well beyond its borders to deal with threats before they
could reach NATO territory. Consequently, the organisation became more
famous for what it was doing outside Europe than inside Europe. Operations
became NATO’s new raison d’être. In the last two decades, the Alliance has
carried out 36 of these operations, ranging from maritime monitoring in the
Adriatic, no-fly zones, close air support, air campaigns, training and mentoring
and combating piracy on the high seas. In doing so, NATO has transformed
itself as much as it has transformed the countries where it has deployed forces.
Operations have brought NATO new partners from across the globe, new rela-
tionships with other international institutions such as the UN, the EU or the
OSCE, and new military doctrines and capabilities that emphasise peace-
building, protection of women in conflict zones and civil reconstruction along-
side traditional war fighting skills. Perhaps most important of all, operations
such as ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo, SFOR in Bosnia or Unified
Protector in Libya have been so demanding and difficult that they have served
as a glue to bind Allies together in a framework of solidarity and at least imper-
fect burden-sharing. This has somewhat overshadowed the way in which the
new security challenges of the 21st century are inevitably giving a much larger
group of Allies (16 in 1999, 28 today) different interests and priorities.
In the past, there was no hiatus between NATO operations. At their high point
around 2006-2007, the Alliance had two hundred thousand troops engaged
beyond its borders in half a dozen simultaneous operations. As soon as one was
winding down, another was building up. One operation could also facilitate
another, as when NATO’s naval embargo against Libya in 2011 drew on ships
and command structures that had already been in the Mediterranean supporting
NATO’s Active Endeavour mission since shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks
on the US. Consequently, the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan in 2014
will place NATO in an unprecedented position. For the first time since its incep-
tion in 1949, it will not have an immediate opponent or adversary to measure
itself against or to serve as a rallying point for its consultations, military plan-
ning and generation of forces. Of course, operations will continue in a more
minor way in Kosovo, in the Gulf of Aden and in the Mediterranean. But they
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will be winding down rather than building up and many NATO Defence Minis-
ters, such as recently the UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, have made it
clear that, barring a new shock event like 9/11, they see very little prospect of
engaging their forces overseas in the next decade or so. Wary of the human and
material costs of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and wary of ambitious
nation-building projects that fall short of their objectives, NATO’s publics have
no more stomach for military humanitarianism if not tied to immediate and well
proven national security interests. Any operations that do take place, such as
training and security assistance for local forces, are likely to be modest and,
more often than not, held in NATO countries rather than on the ground in
Africa or the Middle East. Moreover, where countries do send forces, these are
likely to be Special Forces for quick in/out intelligence driven operations against
specific targets. As warfare moves to the shadows, countries will not seek the
approval or the participation of all their EU or NATO Allies.
Because NATO has focused so much on operations in recent times and has built
its institutional business model largely around enhancing its ability to perform
these missions, the sudden prospect of a decline in operational tempo inevitably
raises questions about the Alliance’s future role and value. Three basic models
for the future are currently going the rounds.
The first is a return to Europe and classical Article V territorial defence. This
would certainly provide reassurance to Allies, particularly those in Central and
Eastern Europe, who have seen Afghanistan as a diversion from NATO’s core
task of collective defence and who would welcome greater NATO visibility and
activity along their Eastern borders, and vis-à-vis a Russia which is rapidly
modernising its military forces and playing a more assertive role in its neigh-
bourhood. Yet, at the same time, the old threat in the form of the Soviet Union
is no more and the threat of armed conflict in Europe is at an all-time low. So
while providing reassurance, a return to the more traditional NATO would also
be compatible with declining defence budgets and a shift from conventional
armies to new types of security investment such as intelligence services, beefed
up police forces to fight organised or domestic terrorist crime, or reinforced
frontier protection measures to keep out unwanted immigrants.
The second model is one of a NATO that overhauls its business model to deal
more directly with the more diverse range of 21st century security threats. By
now these have become all too familiar to security policy specialists. They are
terrorism in its more fragmentary and delocalised manifestations, cyber-attacks,
critical infrastructure protection, resilience to natural or man-made disasters
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a larger
number of state or non-state actors. Already in its most recent Strategic Concept
of November 2010, the Alliance placed greater emphasis on these “emerging
security challenges” and even set up a new division inside NATO HQ to deal
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with them. However, the Strategic Concept did not define a level of ambition for
the Alliance in these areas, nor go into much detail as to how NATO’s existing
assets, such as command structures and planning mechanisms, could be used to
address them.
Three years on, NATO has made some progress, especially in improving its
capacity to detect and defend against cyber-attacks against its own internal
networks and to provide a basic level of assistance and expertise to Allies to
improve their cyber defences. But, at the same time, NATO has also had to
recognise that these new challenges require a very different approach than
conventional types of threat. The domains are not owned by states; the private
sector has often a much greater role to play in analysing threats and providing
the necessary capabilities. Concepts such as solidarity, Article V collective
defence and deterrence and retaliation are much more difficult to pin down than
when dealing with an unambiguous, massive kinetic aggression. Within NATO
countries these threats are usually dealt with by intelligence services, police
departments and interior ministries that are not NATO’s usual interlocutors.
Therefore it seems unlikely that, after ISAF, NATO can make homeland defence
against asymmetric threats into a new justification for the Alliance. Even if
NATO’s assets can allow it to play a useful role in some of these areas, it will
not be able to claim the same leading and almost exclusive responsibility that it
has long enjoyed for large scale, multinational military deployments. At the
same time, the EU has also taken up the same threats with its broader panoply
of instruments and better capacity to integrate the civilian and military dimen-
sions of a comprehensive approach. This will make those Allies who are also EU
members wary of building capabilities inside the Alliance which they are already
investing money into building within the EU.
The above-mentioned considerations have thus put the main emphasis on the
third model for NATO’s future. This is one of an Alliance in readiness rather
than in deployment, to use the terminology of NATO’s Secretary General,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This model essentially sees the future of NATO as a
continuation of its past – only without the pressure of a major operation to
generate the political attention and financial resources to sustain NATO’s
activity. The focus is to preserve all of the key structures that are necessary to
rapidly regenerate future operations, on the assumption that if the past is any
guide to the future and notwithstanding public weariness, there will eventually
be crises which only well-equipped and trained and ready-to-go armed forces
will be able to deal with. This crisis could involve the physical protection of
NATO territory, for instance in the form of a missile attack, or require another
projection of forces on NATO’s borders or beyond. NATO’s choice, therefore,
will be to focus on high-end operations built essentially around a conventional
military core structure and organised through an integrated command system.
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In a way, this is what has been achieved in Afghanistan although it has been a
painful process to train forces to fight, lift caveats, make command structures
more flexible and create a single communications network. As the forces leave
Afghanistan, they are smaller but arguably more usable than they have been for
many years and with a high degree of interoperability not only between Allies
but with partner countries too. NATO has designed a Connected Forces Initia-
tive to preserve and develop these skills. The initiative is built around an ambi-
tious programme of live exercises and training, which are also designed to
develop skills which have been neglected during the ISAF years, such as major
joint operations at high intensity. Defence budget cuts post-ISAF and the general
neglect of training over the past decade because of the demands of the deploy-
ment in Afghanistan, will make it a challenge for NATO to implement the
Connected Forces Initiative. This will put a premium on NATO’s ability to
convince nations to factor NATO training needs into their national training and
exercises as well as to generate forces for the exercise programme in a way that
shares burdens equitably and keeps the smaller and medium-sized Allies fully
engaged alongside the larger US, French and UK forces. It is very difficult to plan
an ambitious exercise if commanders have no idea who will be participating
with what. Moreover, keeping partners, such as Australia or New Zeeland who
are on the other side of the world, engaged will also be a challenge, especially if
all the training activities take place in Europe. Keeping the US engaged cannot
be taken for granted either unless NATO is able to find a headquarters in the US
to take on the NATO training role. This said, if the Connected Forces Initiative
does not succeed, there is a real danger that four or five years on from ISAF,
many of the Alliance forces will have returned to static or limited homeland
defence roles and will not be able any longer to make a contribution to high-end
force projection, even in niche roles. Small coalitions of the willing will become
the order of the day.
The second challenge is in developing capabilities. The operation in Libya as
well as ISAF have consistently pointed to capability gaps and shortfalls in areas
such as precision-guided munitions, intelligence surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (such as RPAS), counter-fire capability, and heavy lift helicopters and air
transport. These shortfalls have been around for a long time but the need for
NATO to plug these gaps is all the more important at a time when the US is now
contributing 72% of the total NATO defence budget and is also pivoting to
Asia. This has revived the burden-sharing debate in the Alliance while also
making it less clear to what extent US capabilities will be available to compen-
sate for the shortfalls in the European order of battle. NATO’s military author-
ities have also identified a requirement for ¼1.4 billion of essential priority infra-
structure to underpin the reinforcement, deployability and protection of
NATO’s deployed forces. The challenge is made more difficult still by the 15%
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overall reduction in European defence spending in the past decade and growing
imbalances among the Europeans themselves, with France and the UK now
contributing nearly 50% of overall EU defence spending. NATO has developed
an ambitious goal, known as “NATO Forces 2020” for how it can acquire key
multinational capabilities.
The question is can it develop a political and planning process to persuade its
Member States to move in the desired direction; namely to pool and share
existing assets and to develop new ones collectively? Can it overcome an attach-
ment to national sovereignty, industrial protectionism and decades of a frag-
mented defence and R&D market? Is the answer “Smart Defence”, where small
groups of Allies propose to develop a capability bottom-up; or is it “Framework
Nation” or the “Menu of Choices” where the big nations take on a specific
chunk of NATO’s military defence and organise the contribution of small and
medium-sized Allies to support that capability? It is always good to experiment
with different approaches, to see which one will be the most politically and
financially viable but one thing is clear: NATO will need to rapidly identify the
best approach and increasingly organise its defence planning and capability
development work around it. The alternative is that nations will continue to cut
their defence budgets and take their decisions nationally and unilaterally with
the result that NATO will have too much, in some areas (jet aircraft) and too
little in others (ISR – RPAS).
Thirdly, NATO will need to debate whether it keeps its military assets essentially
to itself and for its own missions, or whether it is willing to act as a service
organisation or facilitator on behalf of others. Traditionally, NATO has carried
out training and capacity building as a consequence of its own deployments in
places such as Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan and as part of its exit strategy as
it builds down its forces. However, Iraq, where NATO recently closed a training
mission, offers an example of where NATO is able to play a post-conflict role
without being involved in the initial operation. Libya, where the government has
asked for NATO assistance with the development of a national guard, is an
example of where NATO may be able to help some years after conducting an
air campaign but without a force on the ground. If NATO is doing fewer of its
own operations, this in itself does not make the world a more peaceful place.
Others, such as the AU or the UN, will continue to have large numbers of forces
in the field with the related need for equipment, intelligence, transport and
training. What NATO has acquired in the last few years is a considerable
defence infrastructure: strategic commands, military schools, specialist centres
of excellence, simulation and intelligence fusion centres and top class training
areas. Why would it not put all of its know-how and experience in dealing with
threats such as improvised explosive devices at the service of African troops who
are encountering the same problem in Mali or Somalia? NATO’s extensive
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network of partnerships could also be brought to bear on this task as many
partners also have the same military infrastructure and experience and this kind
of “Good Samaritan” role would not only serve NATO’s direct security interests
but also be a way of sustaining its partnerships post-Afghanistan as well.
Finally, relations between NATO and the EU will no doubt continue to be less
than desirable because of the well-known political issues. But the declining
defence budgets, the overlapping memberships and security interests and the all
too present threats on the periphery of Europe will inevitably push the two insti-
tutions closer together – even without mentioning the need for both institutions
to become more self-reliant and less dependent on the US. If NATO embarks on
a larger training role, it will overlap with an area that the CSDP has long been
dealing with and where CSDP is also expanding. If the EU, in the run up to the
December 2013 European Council on Defence, wants to acquire more high-end
multinational capabilities, such as RPAS or advanced sensor and intrusion
mechanisms for cyber defence, it will inevitably overlap with much of the work
being done in NATO. As both organisations seek to make better use of experi-
mental formations such as EU Battlegroups or the NATO Response Force, they
will both have an interest in devising common forms of certification or joint
training and exercises to make optimum use of scarce funds. In the past, and
notwithstanding the political obstacles, NATO and the EU were pushed
together by the momentum of operations, and finding themselves on the ground
together in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or at sea in the Gulf of Aden. They will
certainly be pushed together in the future by austerity and the overwhelming
requirement to make defence more rational and cost-effective and to integrate
further the European forces. They too must develop a common narrative to a
disinterested public opinion why defence and robust armed forces still matter –
when things get rough as, from time to time, they inevitably will. While
continuing their own capability and reform efforts, both the CSDP and NATO
need to do more to encourage and reinforce the efforts of the other. Whatever
the results of the December EU Summit, they will need to be picked up and
amplified at the NATO Summit in the UK in October 2014.
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MODERN EUROPEAN OPERATIONS: FROM PHONEY
WARS TO SICKLE CUTS
ALEXANDER MATTELAER AND JO COELMONT
Throughout the past two decades, European armed forces have been committed
to containing violent conflict. From the campaigns in the Balkans and Afghani-
stan to the recent emergencies in Libya and Mali, they have been called upon to
“do something” and fix whatever could be fixed. In the course of this process,
they have been downsized, professionalised and asked to do ever more with
fewer means. What can we learn from this period of intense operational engage-
ment? Can historical trends continue indefinitely? This essay seeks to outline the
principal areas of tension that have bedevilled modern European-led operations.
Military campaigns never look the same, of course, but whoever ignores past
experience does so at one’s peril.
Institutional Flexibility vs. Strategic Clarity
Multinational operations have become the rule for European militaries. At the
same time, organisational vehicles for conducting such operations have multi-
plied. Whereas the UN represented the only peacekeeping framework at the end
of the Cold War, NATO, the OSCE and the EU transformed into busy “crisis
managers” with their own unique characteristics. Due to variations in terms of
membership, policy competences and pre-existing expertise, each and every one
of these organisations developed its own operational planning process and
command culture. Ad hoc coalitions arguably represent the ultimate expression
of this constant search for institutional flexibility.
As a result of this trend, a dramatic change in command relationships has taken
place. Operation commanders no longer report to a single national leader.
Instead, they receive their strategic guidance from a diplomatic council, of which
the members frequently bicker about mission objectives and financial resources.
Whether talking about the UN Security Council, the North Atlantic Council or
the Council of the EU, the end result is that strategic clarity is often lost and no
one feels responsible for failure. Yet grand strategy and campaign design must
go hand-in-hand. This does not only require that military commanders receive
sufficient authority to do their job, but also that political leaders do not shy
away from making difficult choices about ends, ways and means. Occasionally
a strategy decided by the lowest common denominator may do the job.
Frequently it does not: grand strategy is about setting political priorities and
according resources accordingly.
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Provided that strategic clarity is safeguarded, the institutional flexibility avail-
able to Europeans represents a key asset. The EU’s CSDP adds value on three
accounts. Firstly, it constitutes a framework for launching crisis management
operations in those parts of the world where other organisations are not
welcome: think Rafah, Georgia, Aceh or Chad. Secondly, it holds the promise
of synchronising the different instruments of European foreign policy. The
counter-piracy operation Atalanta arguably illustrates best what the EU can
deliver in terms of comprehensive action. In order to fully live up to this
promise, however, it is imperative that the EEAS is endowed with greater
authority to effectively coordinate these instruments and that both civilian and
military instruments are appropriately resourced. Thirdly, and most fundamen-
tally, it represents an insurance policy that Europeans can act autonomously if
US leadership is absent. Given the Obama administration’s decision to rebalance
its strategic focus towards the Asia-Pacific region, it becomes imperative that
Europe is ready to engage in the full spectrum of strategic affairs. Frankly put,
this implies the collective ability to make war, should it ever prove necessary.
Prevention, Rapid Response and … the Real World
It has become popular to rhetorically embrace the importance of preventive
action and the ability to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies. Yet one
needs to call a spade a spade. The European track record for acting preventively
or rapidly is uneven at best and miserable at worst. Several European authorities
accurately forecasted the degeneration of the Sahel region, yet the resulting
action took so long to materialise that the conflict prevention discourse seemed
farcical. The time required for setting up tiny EU operations in Africa has occa-
sionally exceeded the eighteen-month period required for planning Operation
Overlord. This is not only the EU’s problem: NATO responded painfully slow
to the rising tide of insurgency in Afghanistan. More than anything else, this
bleak track record is the product of political disagreement. Whenever European
Member States have acted quickly – in the Congo in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006
or in Libya in 2011 – it was the undisputed political willingness to act that
proved to be the decisive factor.
To be proficient in mounting any operational rapid response means to have
access to permanent command structures endowed with the authority to engage
in prudent planning (that is, without explicit political authorisation). NATO’s
integrated command structure effectively constitutes the Alliance’s most impor-
tant asset – which is now at risk of being hollowed out by blind cost-savings. If
Europeans are serious about reducing their dependency on US support, it is
imperative they reinvest in standing and flexible command arrangements that
are useable regardless whether political direction is exercised by the North
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Atlantic Council or the Council of the EU. As the experience is Bosnia has
shown, the old Berlin Plus arrangement was never designed for allowing rapid
response and needs to be fundamentally rethought. A more Europeanised
command architecture can also incorporate the EU’s much-vaunted comprehen-
sive approach in a manner that is institutionally coherent.
Quite apart from being able to plan ahead, the recent crisis in Mali illustrates
the importance of having well-trained troops on standby to carry out time-sensi-
tive missions at the appropriate strategic tempo and with tactical élan. The EU
Battlegroups represented a qualitative improvement on earlier force catalogues,
but have not lived up to the promise of providing a useable tool. Tailored to the
historical experience of the Artemis operation, the Battlegroup concept falls
short of providing decision-makers with flexible options. In their current config-
uration, most EU Battlegroups simply lack the fighting power for any mission
that goes beyond political symbolism. From a military point of view, the real
answer to the present conundrum must encompass a larger set of first entry
forces on standby as well as a pool of follow-on forces from which a tailor-made
task force package can be generated. Apart from encompassing the traditional
land, air and maritime domains, this pool must include adequate space and
cyber assets too. Last but not least, debate is required about immediate reaction
capacity. What assets can be mobilised in near-real time and are these sufficient
to safeguard collective European interests?
Financing, or How to Be Stingy and Waste Money at the 
Same Time
If no EU Battlegroup has ever been used, this is not just because of the military
inadequacy of the concept. Above all else, this is a logical consequence of the
way military operations are financed, namely on a “costs lie where they fall”
basis. Rather than fostering European solidarity, this mechanism promotes a
perversely uneven distribution of costs and ultimately leads to operational paral-
ysis. The NATO Response Force is no different in this regard. At the same time,
EU budgets are routinely used for financing the per diems of African troops
deployed on operations, as is the case in Somalia. Again, this phenomenon is not
limited to the EU. In recent years, the bill for the NATO Security Investment
Programme has nothing but ballooned. Individual states behave individually
stingy, but are collectively willing to spend resources in ways that cannot help
but make eyes roll.
Member States are understandably reluctant to write a blank cheque when it
comes to operational expenditures. Force generation conferences showcase that
national interests are nearly always distributed asymmetrically. The multilateral
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character of modern operations, however, incentivises Member States to free
ride on the efforts of others. When this results in critical shortfalls on the macro
level, expensive solutions such as outsourcing to external parties become the
ultimate stopgap solution. Is it normal, for instance, that the EEAS relies on
private security providers to the extent that it does? Can European operations
truly depend on Russian helicopters in one theatre of operations and credibly
monitor Russian forces in another? The EU lavishly funds security-related
projects overseas but often struggles to convince Member States to contribute
the human resources for making those a success.
European states are now obliged to invest in rapid response assets that are never
used and to maintain expensive national support structures for contributing to
actual operations. Talk about increased European cooperation cannot hide the
fact that in-house military capabilities are currently in free-fall. The financial
architecture supporting European defence efforts needs to be radically
rethought. As far as operational engagement is concerned, a circumscribed
expansion of common funding is required. If soldiers are committed in the name
of the EU – in order to defend European interests and values – it is only reason-
able to expect that at least part of this burden is borne collectively. A system of
European co-financing of operational expenditures constitutes a way to
distribute incentives equitably. Common funding of private “power by the
hour” solutions, by contrast, is to be avoided.
Defence Planning vs. Wishful Thinking
Individual European states can still excel at the tactical level. Displaying impres-
sive expeditionary capabilities, France successfully halted the march of Islamist
rebels in Mali. In the course of the air campaign over Libya, even countries such
as Belgium and Denmark proved they were able to generate significant tactical
output. Yet crisis response operations are not the be all and end all of military
affairs. Any successful military campaign must be the product of a balanced and
flexible defence posture linking all aspects of military power to political
purpose. It is at the strategic level of defence planning, however, that wishful
thinking is most likely to cloud rational judgement. European cooperation has
for too long served as a smokescreen masking longstanding capability shortfalls.
While past operations occasionally amounted to qualified successes, European
states are increasingly unable to generate what is needed for achieving their
ambitions.
The list of capability shortfalls is long and well known. It ranges from mundane
requirements such as tanker aircraft to the technological high-end such as cyber
assets and next generation strike platforms. Put simply, most European armed
THE STATE OF DEFENCE IN EUROPE: STATE OF EMERGENCY?
37
forces are hitherto falling short of transforming themselves into agile, knowl-
edge-based militaries prepared for the future. To a large extent, this is the result
of the limited scope for investment in cutting-edge technologies and the
increased cost of large platforms. Yet European militaries cannot forever
continue to cannibalise those arsenals they acquired during the Cold War. If
there is to be an industrial and material base for sustaining future campaigns of
significant magnitude, this requires renewed investment.
A radically new approach to defence planning is therefore needed. The
revamped NATO Defence Planning Process offers a procedural template for
doing so, starting from an output-oriented level of ambition and encompassing
national as well as multinational capability targets. But can Europeans continue
to rely on the US to plug all gaping holes in their defence posture? If not, this
requires that Europeans launch a parallel planning cycle to take stock of where
they stand without US support and to develop remedies accordingly. Such a
European defence review could for example be organised under the auspices of
the EDA. Above anything else, moreover, individual European nations need to
take this collective exercise seriously, rather than treat capability targets as pie
in the sky.
Conclusion
When looking back at the recent operations in Libya and Mali, it is difficult to
avoid harsh conclusions. Never did so few do so much in the name of so many.
This is not sustainable. When operational solidarity is found absent, political
solidarity is put into question. It is revealing that the supposedly common secu-
rity and defence policy of the EU is specialising in capacity-building missions
while individual Member States revert to national defence planning. This
creeping renationalisation of defence efforts represents a fundamental threat to
European integration as a whole. The European Heads of State and Government
are presented with one final opportunity to opt for a quantum leap forward. If
they do not want to see the European project unravel, they should seize it.
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CSDP IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD: FROM
NEIGHBOURS TO PARTNERS
MARGARITA ŠEŠELGYTƠ
Since the launch of the first CSDP mission in 2003, the EU has not been very
eager to use its crisis management instruments in its Eastern vicinity. Two purely
CSDP missions have been initiated in the region over 10 years: rule of law
mission EUJUST Themis (2004-2005) and monitoring mission EUMM (2008-),
both of them in Georgia. An on-going EUBAM mission to Moldova and
Ukraine (2005) was launched through the ENPI. Though in general the security
situation in the region is relatively stable and therefore does not require the use
of advanced crisis management instruments, three frozen conflicts if unfrozen
might pose a serious challenge for EU security. Moreover they are creating a
negative effect on the general developments in these Eastern neighbourhood
states.
The reluctance of the EU to employ its CSDP instruments in the region more
actively has been determined by several reasons. First of all, the security situa-
tion in those countries did not pose an urgent need to react, except in the case
of Georgia. Secondly, the Eastern neighbourhood is not equally regarded as a
region of primary EU security interest by all Member States. Finally, and most
importantly, Russia considers this region as a zone of its exceptional interests.
Thus any political activity by any other international player in the region is
perceived as a serious challenge for Russian national interests. Moreover, the
main stakeholders in the region do not recognise the EU as a security player in
a traditional sense, further preventing it from playing a more assertive role in the
security domain of the Eastern Neighbourhood. The missions that the EU has
managed to launch in the region were important in showing the EU presence
and testing CFSP and CSDP instruments in the Eastern Neighbourhood, but
suffered from a number of challenges which were hampering their efficiency and
ability to reach their goals. First of all, CSDP instruments were poorly coordi-
nated with the ENP instruments. Secondly, the EU lacked a strategic vision of
what exactly it wanted to achieve in the region and how to best to use its various
instruments for that purpose. These deficiencies have also contributed to the
reluctance of the EU to rely on CSDP instruments in the region.
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“Low Politics” Instruments and “High Politics” Goals in 
the Eastern Neighbourhood
Being a fairly modest security actor in the Eastern neighbourhood the EU never-
theless plays an increasingly important part of an economic partner and donor.
During 2010-2013 the ENPI funds for the Eastern partners consisted of ¼1.9
billion. After the EaP summit in Warsaw in 2011 these funds were increased by
¼150 million for 2011-2013. The EU roots its presence in the region in the prin-
ciples of the ENP, which aims to create a zone of security, stability and pros-
perity around the EU’s borders through a Europeanisation process. In fact, this
approach is quite suitable for the Eastern side of the neighbourhood as it
concentrates on non-sensitive “low politics” and thereby does not provoke
Russia. At the same time it provides technical assistance and financial funds
essential to coping with the challenges of post-soviet societies and thus increases
the security in the region in a broad sense. But it is worth admitting that despite
a presumed comprehensive attitude towards security in the EU, this approach
lacks comprehensiveness. The EU tries to circumvent political instruments and
lacks a strategy to direct its efforts in the region towards an explicit goal. Conse-
quently, the EU’s political influence in the region has not increased significantly
over the years and the overall contribution of the EU to the resolution of frozen
conflicts in Eastern Europe remains somewhat vague, except probably in Tran-
snistria.
The EU has invested a lot into the resolution of this frozen conflict by employing
a wide variety of the measures available: diplomatic instruments, trade,
economic aid, EUBAM with 100 staff, and it seems that those efforts begin to
bear fruit. Since 2012 there have been clear signs of positive progress in the
Transnistrian conflict resolution process. Although it might be argued that there
are also other factors behind this success, such as low ethnic tensions within the
conflict or a lack of a very strong opposition on the part of the main stake-
holders, the contribution of the EU has to be admitted. The challenge is that the
role of the EU and the results of its involvement in frozen conflicts in the Eastern
neighbourhood depend a lot on a general attitude towards the EU in a particular
country. The more a country is interested in closer ties with the EU, the more
demand is created for the EU’s involvement, and subsequently the more progress
is achieved. That explains the almost inexistent role that the EU plays in the
Nagorno-Karabach conflict. The success of the EU’s efforts is also exposed to
the attitudes and actions of other security stakeholders in the region. Despite
strong demand for the EU’s presence in the settlement of the frozen conflict in
Georgia and solid commitment on the EU side (over 200 civilian monitors in
EUMM) the progress is hampered by the lack of cooperation on the Russian
side. The EUMM is yet to be granted access to the territories of the separatist
regions even more so as fortifications are currently being built on the other side
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of the border. It appears that Russia does not have a sincere interest in the ulti-
mate resolution of the frozen conflicts in the region as this might destroy the
instruments of its political leverage. Thus even the positive progress in Transnis-
tria cannot be regarded as irreversible and might be stalled as a consequence of
increasing Moldova’s European aspirations, as warned by the highest Russian
politicians before the forthcoming EaP summit in Vilnius. The political context
in the region creates the conditions in which the EU cannot put too much
emphasis on the instruments of the so called “high politics”, including CSDP
missions, and has to rely on the measures of “low politics”, which create more
demand for the EU’s involvement. However the EU has to realise that even “low
politics” has to be coordinated and have clear goals, as some of them might as
well be those of “high politics”.
Changing Paradigm: A Comprehensive Partnership
Since the revision of the ENP and the launch of EaP in 2009 the attitude towards
the CSDP in the Eastern neighbourhood has been facing a gradual paradigmatic
change in the EU. First of all, the ENP countries are viewed less as a problematic
neighbourhood that has to be secured but more as a partner, which has to be
involved in the EU’s activities. Secondly, the CSDP has ceased to be considered
a taboo within the cooperation initiatives between the EU and Eastern partners.
The change was inspired by several processes. The first one was the launch of
the EaP, which aimed to raise the level of the EU’s engagement within its Eastern
neighbourhood by accelerating political association and deepening economic
integration,21 as well as acknowledging aspirations of some partners to seek a
closer relationship with the EU.22 The EaP foresaw new enhanced partnership
agreements, such as the DCFTA and for the first time recognised the CSDP as
one of the partnership areas, which provides the ground for the FPA, partners’
contribution to missions and operations and their involvement in joint exercises
and trainings. The second threshold was the Lisbon Treaty which has intro-
duced quite a number of novelties for the CSDP. New institutions dedicated
exclusively to the CSDP within the structures of the EEAS such as a Deputy to
the HR responsible for security issues and the CMPD aggregated additional
attention and more consistent interest in CSDP matters. In parallel new institu-
tions in the EEAS have been established within the field of the ENP (an EaP
division and divisions working with bilateral cooperation projects within the
21. Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Council of the European Union, Prague, 7 May
2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-09-78_en.htm.
22. Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Council of the European Union, Warsaw, 29-30
September 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/
warsaw_summit_declaration_en.pdf.
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CMPD). These permanent institutions have brought dynamism and a more stra-
tegic outlook in both fields.
Two processes mentioned above created favourable conditions for another inno-
vation – a new multilateral panel for cooperation in the area of the CSDP within
EaP Platform I Democracy, Good Governance and Stability, which was
launched on 12 June 2013 and had its first meeting on 27 September. The panel
provides a working level multilateral cooperation format between the EU and
EaP countries within the field of the CSDP, which has been lacking in the EU
structures. The launch of the new panel is very important for the EU presence in
the ENP as it allows the EU to rely on a more comprehensive approach,
including hard security issues. Moreover through the link to the EaP financial
instruments the panel becomes eligible for EU funding, which has previously
been unavailable for CSDP initiatives. Finally, as a multilateral and consistent
approach towards CSDP issues in the EaP, the panel attracts more attention to
the region in general. Deputy Secretary General for the EEAS Maciej Popowski
defined the essence of the current CSDP partnerships in three words: knowledge,
impact and legitimacy.23 Partners are expected to bring to the EU their expertise,
improve EU capabilities and increase the political legitimacy of the EU’s
missions and operations. These innovations have definitely created a more
favourable environment for the cooperation between the EU and EaP countries.
Although in the short run progress in cooperation will depend to a great extent
on the willingness and ability of the EaP countries to contribute, in the long run
the panel may contribute to the confidence building in the region and construc-
tion of joint perceptions and values.
It is imperative though that the multilateral panel would be supported by bilat-
eral cooperation projects, as EaP countries differ a lot among themselves and
have diverse expectations towards the EU. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are
interested in advanced general cooperation with the EU, whereas Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and in particular Belarus, have more reserved attitudes. Ukraine and
Moldova have signed FPAs, Georgia and Armenia are currently negotiating.
Georgia and Moldova see the EU within the field of the CSDP as a contributor
to their security, especially in helping to solve frozen conflicts in their territories.
Ukraine on the other hand has the capabilities (including those that the EU
lacks) and interest to increase its role in the EU’s operations. It has already
participated in several rotations of the EU Battlegroups, and new commitments
are foreseen for the forthcoming rotation of the BG HELBROC in 2014 and
possibly in the Visegrad Battlegroup. Ukraine has contributed to the EUPM in
Bosnia Herzegovina, participates in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta and prepares to
23. EEAS DSG Maciej Popowski at the seminar Taking CSDP Partnerships Forward: The Case of the
Eastern Partnership, 2-3 July 2013, Vilnius.
THE STATE OF DEFENCE IN EUROPE: STATE OF EMERGENCY?
45
join Atalanta in 2014 with a fully supported frigate. It is important to realise
these differences and use the panel as a forum for information exchange
enabling all the partners to take from it what best suits their needs, as well as a
platform for the development of new projects.
Way ahead...
The forthcoming EaP Summit and European Council on Defence are generating
more attention than general for both the CSDP and EaP. Lithuania, which
currently holds the EU Council Presidency, has made the EaP one of its main
presidency priorities and is an ardent advocate of these countries in various EU
formats. These developments create a favourable environment for raising CSDP
and EaP related issues.
Will there be anything substantially new proposed in either the EaP Summit or
the EU Council on Defence on CSDP in the EaP? Current discussions in the EU
institutions do not provide much ground for optimism. The EaP Summit will be
devoted to political issues, such as signing and initialling Association Agree-
ments, and will set a general direction for the cooperation between the EU and
partners for several years. These directions will also influence developments in
the CSDP, although the CSDP itself will not be high on the Summit agenda. The
Summit declaration is not likely to offer any revolutionary changes for the
CSDP, except general statements about the role of the CSDP in the region: what
has been achieved since the Warsaw Summit and what lies ahead. Association
Agreements include a part on the CSDP (except the one with Armenia) but they
do not foresee any practical implications. The European Council on defence, on
the other hand, is likely to be overshadowed by other more pressing issues for
the CSDP than the EaP, such as capabilities, defence industry and general direc-
tions for the CSDP. Partnerships in the European Council (not distinguishing the
EaP) will be addressed as a part of a changing paradigm in the EU to better
involve its neighbours in the CSDP and to thereby increase the effectiveness and
visibility of the EU’s external role. It is not likely that the CSDP in the EaP will
receive increased attention during the forthcoming years either, at least until the
Latvian Presidency in the first part of 2015. Greek and Italian Presidencies will
be putting more emphasis on the Southern part of neighbourhood.
Thus the main format for innovation within the CSDP in EaP for several years
will be the panel. As the institutions are already in place the success of the panel
will depend on concrete initiatives and projects, which might come both from
the Partnership countries and EU members. The EU at some point will have to
address one potential challenge – namely how to enhance cooperation and
increase partners’ interests to contribute to the CSDP. On the one hand the EU
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benefits from its power of attraction especially in those countries which have
overt or secret hopes of eventual membership; on the other hand it lacks enough
“carrots” to encourage partners to join costly projects, such as participation in
the CSDP missions. Ukraine contributes a lot at the moment, but its enthusiasm
may fade. Moreover due to institutional regulations that favour EU capabilities
and personnel in CSDP missions, partners face difficulties contributing even if
they want. The dynamism in cooperation might be assured by employing a prin-
ciple of positive discrimination, as contribution of the partners has a double
goal, not only to increase the EU’s capabilities, but also to bring those countries
closer to the EU and its values through cooperation. Finally, the EU Member
States and those working in the EU institutions have to always remember that
progress in the Eastern neighbourhood is a long, step-by-step and not a one-way
process. The EU has to be prepared for set-backs. Even though the Association
Agreement with the Ukraine will be signed and the ones with Moldova and
Georgia initialled, there will be no guarantee that these countries will be getting
closer to the EU in the future. The process of democratisation there is still
fragile. Moldova – the most pro-European and successful EU Eastern partner –
will be having parliamentary elections in November 2014, which might result in
a government with a lesser interest to get closer to the EU. Thus, first of all, the
EU institutions have to grasp the moment and do as much as possible until then.
Secondly, employing a comprehensive approach to its involvement in the EaP
the EU has to build its power of attraction, bringing the value systems of those
countries closer to that of the EU.
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MARE NOSTRUM? THE SEARCH FOR
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY
SVEN BISCOP
The military definitely is not the primary instrument to deploy in Europe’s
southern neighbourhood. Passions run high in on-going domestic disputes,
which might easily spark into conflict (again), with obvious international rami-
fications. Meanwhile, the civil war in Syria, in which foreign volunteers,
regional players and the great powers are already involved, grinds on. In this
infinitely complex geopolitical situation, the impact of outside military interven-
tion is even more unpredictable than usual. The intervention in Libya which
Europeans initiated in 2011 proved as much. Necessary though it was, it directly
aggravated the security situation in the Sahel, necessitating another European
military operation in Mali in early 2013, not to forget Europe’s civilian mission
in Niger since August 2012. The military instrument (as always, of course) is
thus to be used with extreme care.
In fact Europe must ask itself whether it has any instruments with significant
leverage in the region. The “Arab Spring” has not just left large parts of the
Middle East and North Africa and beyond in turmoil. It has also demonstrated
the bankruptcy of the fundamentally paternalistic positive conditionality
(“good behaviour” is rewarded by the proverbial carrot) of the ENP, at least in
our southern periphery. The EU never did implement it as intended, too often
turning a blind eye to lack of reform or worse as long as cooperation in the fight
against terrorism and illegal migration was assured. As a result the supposed
partnership between both shores of the Mediterranean did not substantially
affect the nature of the regimes. Today positive conditionality is in any case out
of sync with the times. Especially (but not only) where people have just made a
revolution, they want to decide on their own future; too heavy-handed outside
meddling, no matter how benevolent, is quickly perceived as insulting. Money
would not change this psychological reality, and in any case we do not have it:
the economic and demographic challenges are beyond Europe’s means to
address alone.
Before envisaging the role of the military instrument therefore, our entire
strategy towards our southern neighbourhood needs urgent reassessment.
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From Partnership to Diplomacy
The time has come to quietly abandon partnership (a notion which is abused at
least as often as the word strategy) as the default mode of organising relations
with our southern neighbours. By establishing partnerships with regimes before
they changed, we took away much of the incentive to reform and simultaneously
limited our own margin for manoeuvre, for once partnership has been declared
it is difficult to maintain a critical distance. Partnership should be reserved for
those States with which we share respect for the universal values on which our
own society is based, and with which we can therefore systematically engage in
joint action. With all other States we should maintain diplomatic relations so as
to foster dialogue which ideally will produce the setting for occasional joint
action. Partnership is the desired outcome – it is not the starting position.
Underlying the abandonment of partnership in favour of diplomacy is the recog-
nition that our past level of ambition was unrealistically high. We should not
give up on the idea underpinning European grand strategy (as codified in the
2003 European Security Strategy): only where States equally provide for the
security, prosperity and freedom of all their citizens are lasting peace and secu-
rity possible. It has in fact been validated by the “Arab Spring”, which has
demonstrated that where States do not provide for their citizens, people will
eventually revolt, violently or peacefully – and successfully or less successfully.
At the same time though it has proved that such fundamental change cannot be
engineered from the outside. External actors can support it if and when
domestic forces align to make it happen. Until then, they can strive to have a
moderating (but not usually a reforming) influence on the regime by main-
taining a critical diplomatic stance and (by diplomatic and other measures)
clearly signalling dissatisfaction in case of the derailing of democratic processes
or severe human rights violations. The emergency brake of the Responsibility to
Protect applies in the gravest cases: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.
What is a realistic level of ambition for European diplomacy then? Where a
revolution has taken place (in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) our objective is the
consolidation of a more equal order. Where it has not, the objective is for
domestic actors to accelerate the speed of reform in order to achieve a peaceful
transition instead of violent upheaval. Our leverage to contribute to these ends
may be limited, but we certainly have instruments that can help nudge develop-
ments in the right direction, even though ours may not be the decisive action.
Diplomacy, to start with, which we should not forget we are actually quite good
at: for example, witness Catherine Ashton’s prominent (even though so far
unsuccessful) mediation efforts in Egypt. Two other important instruments are
the offer of technical expertise (in the police and justice as well as other sectors
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of government), and the creative and targeted use of financial means (for mutu-
ally beneficial investment projects, in the transport and energy sector for
example, that can attract additional regional and international funds).
To this, we should add an unequivocal ambition in the field of security: to
prevent conflict and, where prevention fails, to terminate or at least to contain
it, in order both to exercise our Responsibility to Protect people from war and
to safeguard our vital interests. This is where the military instrument comes in,
in support of diplomacy.
Defence in Support of Diplomacy
That a European ambition with regard to peace and security in the region is
required is indeed another clear lesson of the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”.
First of all, the “pivot” of the American strategic focus is evident: in none of the
three recent conflicts (Libya, Mali and Syria) did Washington seek a leading role.
In Libya, Europeans had to convince the US of the need to intervene, though the
US then had to provide the bulk of the strategic enablers for the air campaign.
The Mali scenario conformed better to US expectations: an intervention initi-
ated and implemented by Europeans, with targeted American support (mainly
ISTAR). In Syria the US had no choice but to engage once chemical weapons
were used, the red line which President Obama had drawn but which he
expected not to be crossed, and which was therefore intended as a diplomatic
way of avoiding major US involvement.
These three conflicts further highlight that in the south Europe’s engagement
cannot remain limited to the ENP countries. The stability of our immediate
neighbours is linked to the stability of “the neighbours of the neighbours”,
hence our “real” neighbourhood, where our vital interests are at stake, goes
beyond the Mediterranean and stretches out into the Sahel, the Horn and the
Gulf. Finally, it should be clear by now that no strategy towards this “broader
neighbourhood” (or towards any region, for that matter) makes sense if it does
not include “hard security”. Stating up front that our grand design for the neigh-
bourhood ended where security problems began has cost us dearly in legitimacy
and effectiveness.
What the “pivot” means is that in this broader neighbourhood it will increas-
ingly be up to Europe to take the lead in maintaining peace and security: to
develop permanent policies of stabilisation and conflict prevention for sure, but
also to initiate the response to crises, and to forge a coalition to undertake the
necessary action (and, if there is no other option, to act alone).
Following its mediation efforts in Egypt, Europe could first of all design a more
systematic diplomatic engagement, aiming to foster cooperation between the
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States of the region. It is in our immediate interest to avoid new regimes having
recourse to a confrontational foreign policy as a way of distracting attention
from domestic challenges, as it is in the interest of all States in the Middle East
to avoid escalation of the Syrian civil war, which has already turned into a proxy
war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, into a full-blown international sectarian
war. Similarly, all states in the Sahel face the same challenge of roving militias in
that vast territory. The military instrument has a role to play in these, notably
through training missions (as they are currently training the armed forces of
Somalia and Mali), which in specific cases may need to be supplemented by the
provision of materiel. It would be a mistake however to assume that all prob-
lems can be solved through training. The military must therefore also provide
Europe with a credible capacity for power projection: such a deterrent will
strengthen our diplomacy.
Vital interests and/or the Responsibility to Protect may dictate actual interven-
tion. Inter-state war in the region, including spill-over of a civil war, surely ought
to be prevented or ended. Unless the UN Security Council seizes the matter and
Europe can act as part of a broader coalition, notably with the US and regional
actors, intervention is unlikely however. Addressing a civil war, particularly
when the Responsibility to Protect arises, is the responsibility of regional actors
first and foremost, but given the limits of will and means external intervention
may prove necessary. In such cases, Europe is more likely to be the only or the
leading external actor, preferably still in coalition with local and regional actors,
as in Libya and Mali. The government of the country in question can of course
request intervention; after Libya, a UNSC mandate is much less certain. As in
Syria today, but also in Georgia (2008), the military feasibility may be
constrained by the implication of external powers, by the chance that any bene-
fits are outweighed by major negative side effects, or by an unacceptably high
risk of casualties. Intervention may then be limited to preventing spill-over and
possibly supporting the legitimate party in the conflict with equipment and
otherwise.
Conclusion
Assuming leadership in maintaining peace and security in our broader southern
neighbourhood does not mean rushing headlong into action. It does mean
taking the initiative to respond to any crisis, at the earliest possible stage, in
order to prevent escalation and the need for military intervention. But if all else
fails, and vital interests and the Responsibility to Protect cannot otherwise be
upheld, we should not shy away from military action either. In parts of this
region at least, such as the Sahel, even limited military means can make a differ-
ence: if none of the parties on the ground has any air support for example, a
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limited deployment on our side can tip the balance. Nevertheless it is a most
sensitive region in which to intervene, which means that the cost-benefit calcu-
lation is even more difficult than usual. A coalition involving local and regional
players is always advisable, in order to avoid mobilisation of public opinion
against Europe. Even if our help is requested, strict political conditions and
long-term follow-up are of the essence if a durable impact is to be had.
It are Europe’s interests that are at stake here much more than America’s – in
that sense it is mare nostrum. But Europe will not stabilise this region against
the local actors, only with them: it is mare nostrum as much for them as for us.
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EUROPE’S ASIAN FRONTIER
JONATHAN HOLSLAG
Asia is becoming one large playing field. The rise of China has effectively
connected Central, South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia by means of roads,
railways, trade, personal exchanges, and regional institutions. In the previous
decade, that arena used to be characterised by growing confidence and cooper-
ation. Six elements were important in this regard. First, most governments
adhered to constructive variants of nationalism and aligned national develop-
ment with globalisation. As a result, they became more integrated into the
global order. Between 2000 and 2012, the share of foreign investment and trade
increased from 3% to 6% and from 40% to 57%. That coincided with an
expansion of intra-regional trade. The share of intra-regional exports of total
Asian exports expanded from 41% to 53% between 2000 and 2012. This trend
was flanked by a gradual institutionalisation of cooperation and a proliferation
of regional organisations. Asian countries also came to recognise non-tradi-
tional security threats as a common challenge and turned them into an oppor-
tunity for military confidence building. All that continued to make most coun-
tries more averse to the use of force and encouraged them to show restraint in
the many conflicts over borders, raw materials and regional leadership.
That restraint cannot be taken for granted. There are four important elements
that could lead to more conflict and instability. To begin with there is the shift
in the balance of power, marked by the rise of China, the failure of South Asia,
the struggling of Southeast Asia and the inevitable decline of Japan. China’s
ascent remains precarious and its economic growth model is unsustainable, but
still it is the only major developing country that expands its industry so rapidly
and advances fast in terms of technology, diplomatic influence and military
prowess. In comparison, the other juggernaut, India, is struggling and falling
prey to financial volatility, political fragmentation, social instability and
domestic violence. The altering balance of power aggravates the traditional
security dilemmas between Asian countries. Second, the growing economic
distortions can cause major crises and draw pragmatic elites away from their
constructive nationalism to more antagonistic variants of nationalism. Third,
the increasing “militarisation” of borders and disputed areas increases the risk
of mishaps that could easily escalate in a context of antagonist nationalism.
Fourth, demographic pressure, demand for raw materials and environmental
hazards are increasing faster than technological solutions are found.
China’s growth remains the main variable. If China keeps its growth on track,
continues to modernise its industrial base, attains high-income status, and grad-
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ually rebalances its economy away from investment- and export-led growth, it
could – theoretically – provide more opportunities to its Asian neighbours. The
downside, however, is that the transition towards that economic leadership
entails a long period – another decade or so – of diverting trade, industrial
opportunities, and possibilities to create jobs. Furthermore, the economic power
shift would imply a military power shift and most likely allow China to outpace
the others in building up a presence in the disputed waters of the South and East
China Sea. That could cause more balancing, confirm China’s suspicion of
nascent containment and lead to fiercer competition. If, however, China’s
growth were to slow down before it builds a strong domestic market, its leaders
could try to secure their position domestically by shifting to antagonistic nation-
alism. Moreover, a sharp slowdown of Chinese economic growth could also
destabilise many of the neighbouring states that depend heavily on exports to
China and commodity prices. Like in China, the most probable result would be
more antagonistic nationalism. Such a climate makes it of course much more
difficult to prevent that tensions spiral out of control. This relates to tensions
with China, but also to other conflict-prone relationships, such as India and
Pakistan, Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia and some of its neighbours, and
so forth. A Chinese slowdown could unravel much of the cooperative mecha-
nisms that developed in the previous decades.
This uncertainty presents Europe with several important security challenges.
First, Europe has to anticipate more economic volatility. Its social stability could
be affected by more assertive industrial policies as well as economic crashes.
Second, Asia’s turbulent transition challenges some of our core objectives, not
the least to advance peace and cooperation through multilateralism. Third, we
should anticipate a spill-over of instability from Asia into our backyard. Distrust
and rivalry could prompt the Asian powers to try to secure their interests unilat-
erally in our extended neighbourhood. Economic problems in Asia could also
add to more social unrest in that area. Fourth, military conflict between the
Asian powers reduces our diplomatic manoeuvrability – especially if the rift
between China and its neighbours were to expand and if that would be followed
by more manifest American balancing. Fifth, the American pivot to Asia
demands Europe to play a more active role in stabilising its neighbourhood.
That could be seen as an important opportunity, but also a threat if it continues
to fail to get its act together. Sixth, the tensions in Asia might lead to a more
rapid militarisation of outer space and the cyber realm. Seventh, a persistent
failure of South and Central Asia to work towards prosperity and stability could
create a security black hole right in between Europe and Eastern Asia. Eighth,
the outbreak of a regional armed conflict would come as a major threat to a
region that has no contingency plans anymore for traditional wars between
states and major powers.
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The Response
This will be an Asian century, but it will unlikely be a century of peace. Europe
should be prepared for major instability, but as long as Asia continues to grow
economically, it should also be ready to reap the benefits.
The first task is therefore to advance our economic interests. Europe should
serve Asia’s growing consumer market more from European factories, not by
relocating more capacity to Asia or allowing Asian countries to divert trade by
aggressive industrial policies.
The second task is to make our main partnerships in Asia more effective instead
of just bigger. Europe should continue to work towards a strong and balanced
relationship with China. It would be a mistake to play up the China-threat. It is
true that many Chinese policies are imperiling our economic interests and it is
also true that its diplomatic choices are not always compatible with ours. Yet,
Europe is equally challenged by the monetary and industrial policies of countries
like Japan, South Korea, India, and, not the least, the US. Neither are we always
on the same page with these countries in diplomatic matters. Important also is
that we analyse China’s role in Asian maritime disputes carefully. As regards the
territorial disputes, China’s claims and its interpretation of the UNCLOS are
often as contentious as those of other countries, including, again, the US. Its
efforts to project naval power into the Pacific are as legitimate or problematic
as America’s efforts to maintain military predominance in this area. It cannot be
excluded that China soon or later will become more belligerent, as we cannot
exclude that for most other Asian powers, but we should remain careful and
balanced in our strategic choices.
It is thus advised to continue to invest in our partnership with China, but also
to strengthen relations with other Asian protagonists. We need to avoid here to
make the mistake of trying to broaden partnerships without strengthening coop-
eration on core economic and political issues. Europe has too often the tendency
to compensate the lack of progress by setting up more dialogues. The precondi-
tion to make this possible is that the EEAS invests more in internal action, that
is, the coordination with Member States and other stakeholders to generate the
maximum of influence out of our resources – economic, diplomatic, and mili-
tary. In the military realm we should not allow our Asian partners to approach
individual Member States for ad hoc synergies, without being able to get mean-
ingful strategic cooperation at the European level in return. There should thus
be cogent frameworks for defence cooperation at the European level within
which the Member States could engage themselves. Particular attention should
go to ASEAN. Europe has to work towards a more effective partnership with
ASEAN, to support the region as a buffer against Asian great power rivalry, and
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help to prevent its further fragmentation, which will inevitably turn the
grouping into a defenceless playground of great power politics.
One of the most important questions is whether Europe should follow the US in
pivoting to the Pacific. That would not be a smart move. Three considerations
should guide Europe in its response to the US pivot. First, it should ask itself
how it could get the maximum of leverage over the Asian powers. Second, it
should think how it could best secure its maritime lifelines to the Pacific. Third,
it has to evaluate how it can make itself most useful vis-à-vis its main partners.
Taking into consideration that Europe’s long-range power projection capacity
will continue to be limited, that it will have limited weight to throw in the Asian
balances of power, and that it faces an increasingly growing number of major
security threats, the choice for Europe should be to make itself indispensible as
a security actor in its extended neighbourhood, including Africa, the Middle
East, Eastern Europe, and the Arctic. This is were the Asian powers are the most
vulnerable, where the EU can bolster its credibility as a security provider, and
strengthen its credibility in the Atlantic partnership as the US focuses more on
the Pacific. Pivoting to Asia without strengthening our position in our imme-
diate neighbourhood would be reckless and dangerous.
What has to be done? First, Europe needs to re-energise its neighbourhood
policy, restore its position as a capable partner of countries in that area,
strengthen its role as an economic player, and regain confidence as a source of
inspiration. Second, Europe must come up with an integrated policy to improve
security in Africa and the Middle East. This involves local capacity building,
conflict prevention, but also the ability to project power whenever new conflicts
might erupt. Third, Europe needs to establish a defence perimeter that stretches
from Gibraltar to the Gulf of Aden and from the Gulf of Aden to the Artic. Such
a defence perimeter should consist of joint security hubs. Therefore, it can
depart from existing facilities of the Member States in the Mediterranean, the
Gulf, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. But it will also be essential to establish some
sort of presence in the Caspian Sea Region so as to monitor and contain future
instability in Central Asia. Besides these hubs, a forward naval deployment is
indispensible. Europe should have a significant naval presence in the northern
Atlantic, the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean and around the Gulf Region
(Including the Western part of the Indian ocean). Such a presence could be
organised around the five aircraft carriers. These hubs and this naval presence
should play an important role in building security partnerships with our neigh-
bours and conditioning the security involvement of Asian powers. Fourth,
Europe needs to limit its vulnerability to possible aggression from space and
cyber.
Europe thus requires the full spectrum of military capabilities. While it should
be able to use its armed force constructively, to cement partnerships and so
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forth, it must also be able to defend itself against a spillover of instability from
Asia into its neighbourhood, and from that neighbourhood into Europe itself.
In other words, it has to have the upper hand in the transit zone between Europe
and the surrounding arc of disquiet and be able to deny access to those
“external” powers that threaten its security.
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EUROPEANS AND THE “WIDER NORTH”
JAMES ROGERS
In 1827, the British explorer, Sir William Parry – of the Royal Navy – set out on
one of the first purposeful expeditions to locate the North Pole. Many came
before and after him: many of those intrepid explorers also perished. While he
went further north than anyone before him, he ultimately failed – although he
lived to tell the tale. The North Pole was eventually found, but the extreme
climate and the thick ice sheets prevented human penetration until the middle of
the twentieth century, which, even then, was only in a military-strategic way.
Over the past decade, however, particularly with the onset and acceleration of
climate change, the north has started to open and scientists project that, by
2050, the Arctic Ocean will be ice free for much of the year. This is drawing
increasing attention from local, regional and even global powers – Norway,
Russia, Canada, the US, China and others – to assert their interests, both
economic and political.
However, the EU – with its own territory within the Arctic Circle and hence
definitively an Arctic power – has taken less interest in the affairs of its northern
proximity than it otherwise might. Its much-vaunted “Northern Dimension”
and nascent “Arctic Policy” have remained hamstrung as entrenched structural
economic problems and the Arab revolts have concentrated European leaders’
attention on their southern rimland. Likewise, the European Commission’s Joint
Communication to the European Council and the European Parliament in 2008,
which outlined three themes for its northern perspective – “knowledge”,
“responsibility” and “engagement” – has failed to drive Europeans forward.
The EU has also failed to gain full membership of the Arctic Council, even
though two of its Member States are part-located in the Arctic region and
another has an overseas territory there. It remains merely an observer. The ques-
tion arises: how can it become a power?
Geopolitics and the Construction of the “Wider North”
Acquiring power necessitates a thorough understanding of geopolitics. This
accounts for a way of thinking that looks at the interaction between humans and
their geographic surroundings – or rather, the way that geography impedes
human activities, encouraging them to develop new forms of technology to over-
come those constraints. Geography is – after all – “fundamental” and “perva-
sive” for it ‘impose[s] distinctive constraints and provide[s] distinctive opportu-
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nities that have profound implications for policy and strategy’.24 However, this
does not necessarily mean that geography determines human possibilities, for
there are many ways of reacting to geographic constraint or change. The UK and
Japan, for example, are both islands, located off continents, but both developed
very differently: whereas the former adopted an expansive maritime approach,
the other closed in on itself for many centuries, until forced open by external
powers.
This is where geostrategy comes in: those societies best able to maximise their
command over the natural world are likely to be more successful than those who
do not. However, as Grygiel notes: ‘[t]he geostrategy of a state [...] is not neces-
sarily motivated by geographic or geopolitical factors. A state may project
power to a location because of ideological reasons, interest groups, or simply
the whim of its leader’.25 Indeed, there is no a priori explicit linkage between
strategy and geography; governments have often failed to properly link the two
– perhaps best reflected by the historical case of Japan. Had the Japanese not
adapted an insular geostrategic culture, they might have ended up more like the
British – outward looking – and indeed, they did after the Meiji Restoration
during the late nineteenth century.
The point here is that to flourish economically, politically and culturally, polit-
ical communities must actively seek to establish their command over the natural
world and – consequentially – over rival societies. However, the urge to do this
is often a consequence of some form of dislocation. In Japan’s case, this occurred
when the US’ “Black Ships” entered the Bay of Tokyo; in Britain’s case when
Spanish power began to surround and endanger the home islands in the
sixteenth century. Further, when one society masters new ways of altering the
constraining impact of geography, or when it successfully overcomes an external
threat – the region in question is likely to be altered, often irrevocably.26
A similar dynamic may now be underway in the extreme Northern Hemisphere.
For much of modern history, this region was largely impenetrable. The inhospi-
table climate made human settlement very difficult. Any settlement that did
occur was confined to the southern extremes of the region (like Scandinavia and
the Baltic rim), which were part of alternative geopolitical sub-systems like
Northern and Eastern Europe or the North Atlantic. Even as the invention of
intercontinental bombers, ballistic missile technology and nuclear propulsion
during the 1950s merged with the Arctic’s pivotal position between Soviet
24. Gray, C.S. (1996) “The Continued Primacy of Geography”, Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Vol.
40, No. 2: p. 248.
25. Grygiel, J. (2006) The Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins
University Press): p. 22.
26. Rogers, J. (2012) “A New Geography of European Power?”, in Biscop, S. and Whitman, R. (eds.) The
Routledge Handbook of European Security (Abingdon: Routledge).
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Russia and the Western democracies, its geopolitical significance only grew due
to the superpowers’ nuclear strategies. Hidden by its murky depths, American,
British and Soviet ballistic missile submarines found the Arctic Ocean a suitable
location to lurk during the Cold War, only a handful of minutes striking distance
from each others’ strategic centres of gravity. The region’s importance swiftly
declined with the end of the Iron Curtain.
After a period of relative quiet, the Arctic has started to re-emerge as a region of
geopolitical intrigue.27 This is being driven by two interwoven factors:
1. The dense polar ice-sheets are starting to melt, meaning that except for the
winter months, the Arctic Ocean will likely be navigable by the 2050s.
Should even the most moderate climate projections become a reality by the
middle of the twenty-first century, it is likely that the Arctic Ocean will no
longer remain such an impenetrable and inhospitable space. It will always be
a very difficult environment to work and live in, especially during the winter
months, but it could nonetheless emerge as an alternative transit route
between the centres of economic production in North-Western Europe and
North-Eastern Asia.
2. As the world is becoming more multipolar, the larger surrounding powers
are beginning to consider how the changing environment – both natural and
geopolitical – may affect their interests in the northern zone. How will a
more open and warmer north affect the geography and development of Rus-
sia, for example?
These developments may transform the Arctic from an icy wilderness to the
centre-piece of a new geopolitical zone. This Wider North will likely envelop
many European countries, such as Denmark (and Greenland), Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the UK and the Irish
Republic, given that the British Isles act as the strategic gateway between the
Atlantic and Arctic Oceans.28 Germany, Poland, France and the Netherlands
may also be drawn in given their proximity to the Baltic Sea and the North Sea
and the requirements of their economies, i.e., unfettered access to the sea for the
purposes of trade. More distant countries, like Japan, South Korea, the US and
Canada, all with northern vectors, may also be drawn in.
27. Emmerson, C. (2011) The Future History of the Arctic: How Climate, Resources and Geopolitics Are
Reshaping the North, and Why It Matters to the World (London: Vintage Books).
28. Rogers, J. (2012) “Geopolitics and the ‘Wider North’: The United Kingdom as a ‘Strategic Pivot’”,
RUSI Journal, Vol. 157, No. 6: pp. 42-53.
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To 2050: Contrasting Futures
So as climate change takes its toll and as surrounding powers increase their
interest in the region, what might it look like by the middle of the twentieth
century? There are two main possible trajectories:
Peace in the Wider North: analysts were relieved that climate change did not
have the impact on the Wider North that it was originally projected to have.
While the Ultra-Plinian eruption of an Indonesian volcano in 2026 killed
millions of people, it did envelop the Earth’s atmosphere in a thin layer of ash,
which led to the decade-long onset of a volcanic winter. The previously melting
ice actually began to refreeze, closing the Northern Sea Route and derailing
Moscow’s efforts to lift-up Russia’s northern areas through the development of
new infrastructure on the Siberian coast. In any case, the eruption left the world
with many other issues to deal with – such as maintaining food supply in some
regions – reducing the desire of countries to engage in geopolitics in the North.
In any case, the stagnation of the Putin regime in the late 2020s further stymied
Russia’s ability to influence its surroundings, as the country’s numerous oblasts
clamoured for greater autonomy under acute agricultural and demographic
pressures. Likewise, the birth of constitutional government in Beijing in the late
2030s – after the “Elders’ Movement” earlier that decade – created a much less
assertive China. The Chinese turned inward to refine their democratic structures
and thoroughly sweep away what came to be known as the “era of repression”,
even as they continued to grow in wealth and power. Analysts feared that the
major powers had not forgotten their interests in the North but had merely put
them on the back-burner.
Struggle in the Wider North: By 2040, Western hegemony had been greatly
reduced, not least by a combination of climate change and the rise of non-
Western counties, particularly China and Russia. With the Northern Sea Route
having been opened, and human habitation of Russia’s northern expanses been
enabled, China was keen to extend its control over Eurasia’s near-unlimited
resources. The intensification of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation during
the 2020s finally altered the global balance of power: the agreement reached
between Beijing and Moscow was undoubtedly in China’s favour, but the
Russian regime – long prickly and paranoid – was determined not to
“surrender” to the Euro-Atlantic structures. Backed by China’s industrial
strength and growing military might, Russia realised that a consumer was ready
and willing to procure its resources – a consumer that did not attach multiple
caveats requiring political reform.
Northern and Eastern European countries looked on as the China-Russia axis
solidified: a single geopolitical constellation was beginning to take control of the
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Eurasian heartland, exerting pressure on all fronts. The Western maritime
powers – a British-French led EU, Japan, Korea and the US – had their work cut
out: not only were they busy maintaining order around the southern rimlands
of Eurasia, but now they were facing a rising threat to the North and East.
Beijing realised that opening another geopolitical front would serve its wider
agenda in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in South-East Asia, by splitting the
West’s dwindling resources. It actively supported the Russians’ northern policy,
providing Moscow with the latest weapons systems, safe in the knowledge that
Russia could never again challenge Chinese power. By 2050, two hostile blocs
looked on at one another.
Preparing for the Emergence of the “Wider North”
Whatever future takes hold in the upper Northern Hemisphere, the EU and its
Member States are unlikely to remain unaffected. Should the Wider North
emerge as an integrated geopolitical space, sucking in several powerful external
countries, Europeans must be ready and waiting. Rather than a reactive policy,
which kicks in after something goes wrong, Europeans require a more assertive,
integrated and preventative approach that places their needs and interests at the
forefront.
Shrewd diplomatic action is needed, but this is not by itself enough. Military
capabilities – and the techno-industrial base required to support them – are
essential to undergird diplomacy, much like a police force does its part to uphold
the law.29 More than that, military capabilities act as a restraint on other
powers’ calculations and actions, particularly those like Russia, which continues
to see international relations through the lens of the “modern”. In this respect,
Europeans could not do nothing better than to remember the insights of the
naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who proclaimed that: ‘[f]orce is never
more operative than when it is known to exist but is not brandished’.30 Unfor-
tunately, few Europeans – even the UK and France – possess significant projec-
tion forces that are suitable for patrols or operations in the northern extremes.
Norway has some capable and sophisticated military instruments, but not in a
number sufficient to undergird European interests.
The Wider North may not be on the minds of European leaders at the European
Council in December 2013. There are more pressing needs: like halting the
general malaise in European armed forces. However, strategic thinking means
29. Cooper, R. (2004) “Hard Power, Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy”, in Held, D. and Koenig-
Archibugi, M. (eds.) American Power in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity Press).
30. Mahan, A.T. (1912) “The Place of Force in International Relations”, The North American Review,
Vol. 195, No. 674: p. 31.
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forward planning. If the Wider North takes shape, Europeans will need to
bolster the cold weather capacities of their armed forces to facilitate patrols and
operations in the icy extremes, to establish and sustain a European presence, or
to support smaller partners and allies and to deter foreign aggression against the
EU’s northern perimeters. Most importantly, enhanced situational awareness
will be crucial in the years ahead, not least as other non-European, even non-
Western powers, seek to muscle in and make their voices count.
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OBJECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS

67
CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT: THE TIMES THEY ARE
A-CHANGIN’
JO COELMONT AND ALEXANDER MATTELAER
Military capabilities cannot be discussed in isolation of the geostrategic environ-
ment, for they refer to the ability to achieve specific effects that are ultimately
determined by political reality. The European capability development process
can therefore not make abstraction of budgetary austerity, the turmoil following
the Arab Spring or the US “pivot” to the Asia Pacific. These developments may
indeed suggest that European defence approaches a state of emergency. This
conclusion, however, is only a snapshot of the present. To understand where we
are going requires knowing where we have been. Such a historical perspective
makes clear we are witnessing a dramatic increase in the importance of strategic
assets. In fact, the future acquisition of major defence systems is critically
dependent on political desperation. Sovereignty only means as much as one’s
ability to act permits, and this ability is dwindling fast across the European
continent. Desperate times therefore call for desperate measures: the reconstitu-
tion of sovereignty as the collective ability of European nations to bring military
power to bear.
Changing Paradigms
In the middle of the Cold War, it was deemed unacceptable to spend less than
4% of GDP on defence. Even in these days of relative plenty for defence plan-
ners, a transatlantic division of labour was firmly in place. European states
generally concentrated their defence efforts on generating sufficient numbers of
tactical assets, be it fighter squadrons or mechanised brigades. In turn, the US,
and to a limited extent the UK and France, invested a large share of their
resources in strategic assets, such as expeditionary logistics, C4ISTAR systems
and long-range (nuclear) strike platforms. Together, Europeans and Americans
maintained an integrated command structure for imbuing NATO’s common
defence clause with real meaning. This package provided the baseline from
which post-Cold War defence planning must inevitably depart.
For European planners, the political urge to cash in on the so-called “peace
dividend” was paradoxically accompanied by a drive towards greater expedi-
tionary deployability of a shrinking pool of tactical assets. Ever since the 1998
Saint Malo accords, it was clear that Europeans suffered from important stra-
tegic shortfalls limiting their ability to act – be it autonomously or as equal
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partner of the US. The post-9/11 defence spending spree in Washington allowed
for these shortfalls to be systematically covered, even if it also deepened the
transatlantic gap in terms of military technology. As such, European militaries
could continue to play the role of US military subcontractors in places as far
away as Afghanistan. The transatlantic division of labour therefore continued
well into the post-Cold War period. In many ways this trend culminated in the
air campaign over Libya: an intervention initiated by European ambitions was
critically reliant on US strategic assets. This dependency not only ranged from
tomahawk missiles to suppress enemy air defences to RPASs to collect intelli-
gence as far as the operational front office was concerned. It applied equally to
back office functions of the logistical support and command structures (think
tanker aircraft and combined air operation centres).
The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and the changing character of the oper-
ational environment are turning this longstanding division of labour upside
down. The American willingness to pick up the slack is diminishing just as the
operational importance of strategic enablers increases. This entails a true para-
digm shift for European defence planners. The future availability of sufficient
strategic assets will determine the European ability to act, be it nationally or
collectively. And – surprise, surprise – this debate is intimately intertwined with
the future of the European defence industry. As the spiralling cost of hi-tech
defence systems is driving unit prices up, order numbers are going down, casting
a long shadow over an industrial sector that is responsible for driving techno-
logical innovation forward.
Pooling and Sharing, or Muddling Through by Another 
Name?
So far, European capitals have responded to this emerging paradigm shift by
putting forward the slogan of pooling and sharing. But before issuing yet
another clarion call, let us look in the mirror. Pooling and sharing was launched
because the original project – establishing PESCO – failed. In fact, the under-
lying idea of pooling and sharing has been around since the 1970s, if not earlier.
Moreover, pooling and sharing cannot possibly compensate for the huge
amount of budget cuts national defence has had to swallow recently. As the
former Director-General of the EUMS Ton van Osch has stated, the combined
European defence cuts are approximately one hundred times the size of the
expected benefits of currently agreed pooling and sharing initiatives. Far too
many of these individual projects are concerned with marginal savings in the
field of tactical capabilities. In political terms, pooling and sharing is effectively
used as a means to camouflage the imminent loss of sovereignty. Faced with
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another round of cuts, Europeans planners attempt to muddle through once
more. With some notable exceptions, it is still business as usual – at least for
now.
This is not to say that pooling and sharing has no potential. When looking at
the development and purchasing cost of satellite systems, future air systems and
major naval platforms, it is not rocket science to understand that European
states can get much more value for money if they spend their Euros together.
Some states are already going pragmatically forward in fields such as air trans-
port. The challenge is to move forward with European answers to the full list of
strategic shortfalls. The fragmented nature of the European defence market is
only sustainable as long as industrial answers can match operational require-
ments within the available budgetary envelope. In an era of falling defence
expenditures, this means that deeper European cooperation is unavoidable. The
added value of genuine pooling and sharing therefore resides in the spontaneous
emergence of joint defence planning among partners. And if one is indeed
willing to risk a quantum leap forward in terms of coordinating European
defence planning, the era of austerity need not mean the end of sovereignty, on
the contrary. This is of course a matter of political insight and acting accord-
ingly. Perhaps Jean Claude Juncker was talking about more than economic
reforms when he stated that ‘we all know what to do, we just don’t know how
to get re-elected after we’ve done it.’
The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Realm of Defence
The history of European integration is based on the application of the Monnet
method and the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. the allocation of policy compe-
tences to the lowest possible level. The former assumed the shape of economic
integration only after the proposal for establishing a European defence commu-
nity had been defeated. It is therefore highly symbolic that the theme of Euro-
pean defence has crept back on the policy agenda six decades onwards. The
latter assumes a five-step process to be followed before specific policy compe-
tences are uploaded to the European level. The first requirement is that it must
be beyond reasonable doubt that the European level would bring greater effi-
ciency. Second, there must be a significant amount of damage suffered already.
Third, the damage must be of such magnitude that it cannot be hidden from
public view. Fourth, the political class must reach a state of desperation: nothing
focuses the mind like the prospect of a hanging. Fifth and finally, there must be
no possible alternative left.
So where are we with European defence? It becomes increasingly difficult to
mask the dire state of affairs behind the smokescreen of pooling and sharing.
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Shell-shocked by austerity, anyone interested in defence issues is near a state of
despair. Under the pressure of the US pivot, Europe is now drifting towards the
fifth level. For now European states are experimenting with the last possible
alternative: that of regional clusters. It is no coincidence that the Lancaster
House Treaties provided the first attempts at pooling and sharing of strategic
assets like carrier groups and satellite communications. It is questionable
however, that these clusters will be able to bring about the required critical mass
for investing in the development of sufficient strategic assets. The question
therefore becomes: can the European Heads of State and Government now
muster the will to make the quantum leap first imagined by René Pleven?
A Question of Timing?
The upcoming European Council on defence presents the first opportunity in
many years to come to terms with these thorny issues. As the defence theme has
now been put on the agenda, a considerable risk has been taken already. It is
now all too easy to point out that the pooling and sharing emperor has no more
than a fig leaf for clothing. On the bright side, the summit creates an opportu-
nity to provide considerable impetus to the work of the European institutions in
the realm of defence. Top-down steering of the institutional staff work is
required to overcome the ubiquitous turf wars and bureaucratic gridlock. The
EEAS may need reminding that the comprehensive approach is not meant to
prevent the EU from growing military teeth. Similarly, the Commission’s efforts
in safeguarding the EDTIB deserve the support of Member States. A purely
market-based approach to the European defence industry is of course flawed: as
defence assets ultimately qualify as the bedrock of state sovereignty, a strategic
mindset is needed. The fundamental purpose of the European defence industry
is to generate the toolkit required for defending Europe’s vital interests – all else
is secondary.
Yet the puzzle remains: how to square defence integration with the idea of state
sovereignty? The answer is surprisingly simply. Under current levels of defence
investment, national sovereignty is eroding to no more than a shadow of its
former self. What is the ability to act of a state that has become utterly
dependent on strategic enablers provided by the US, now a self-declared weary
policeman? European sovereignty, if it is to mean anything substantive, must be
rebuilt at a level commensurate with the magnitude of the common problem
that needs to be resolved. Together, Europeans can generate the minimum mass
required to hold their ground on the global level. On their own, they represent
no more than the proverbial grass whereupon elephants fight. At the end of the
day, on their own or even in clusters, Europeans cannot pool their strategic
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shortfalls. They can only share the frustration about their collective inability to
act.
“Is there really no alternative?”, the sceptics may ask. There is, in fact, one
logical alternative remaining. It is the full revamping of national defence efforts,
which in turn requires vastly greater investment – which even then may not
suffice. This also amounts to betting the farm on European integration, for it
represents the undoing of the original gamble of coal and steel. Europe’s leaders
must reflect long and hard about the options they have left. Defence establish-
ments and national industries alike suggest that time is running out. Showdown,
ladies and gentlemen!
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THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE TECHNOLOGICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL BASE: FIVE SUGGESTIONS
DANIEL FIOTT
The rationale for any DTIB is to supply governments with cost efficient and high
performance military equipment. DTIBs are the essential link between industry
and the military; between the overalls of the factory and the camouflage of the
battlefield. Without industrial capacities the production of military capabilities,
as they relate to national security, both in terms of defence and force projection,
is impossible. Defence firms are critical to the defence-industrial supply chain,
as in Europe it is firms that largely conduct R&D activities and ultimately have
the financial and human capital to develop military capabilities. Given that
governments are dependent on the defence-industrial supply-chain for the
accoutrement of capabilities essential to national security, and by virtue of
governments being the largest consumers of military equipment, defence
markets are unique in that governments tend to play a key ownership role in
defence firms.
Yet some national DTIBs have come under increasing strain as the costs of
equipment increase and defence budgets decrease – a combination that is
making it harder for some states to maintain capabilities and production capac-
ities commensurate with national security. Governments privilege their own
DTIB as this is perceived to be a way to maintain security of supply, support
national firms and protect jobs. Despite this truism, however, the “European”
DTIB (EDTIB) has emerged as a policy idea in response to defence market pres-
sures. The idea behind the EDTIB is to overcome market fragmentation by
harmonising government demand where possible, promoting multinational
capability programmes, ensuring security of supply and maintaining and
encouraging jobs, innovation and growth. Regulatory efforts by the European
Commission have also sought to forge an EDTIB and EDEM by promoting
defence market liberalisation. Whether a genuine EDTIB or EDEM actually
exists, however, is a point of debate.
The December Council meeting will necessarily have to address the ideas
surrounding the EDTIB. While the associated debates are most likely to be
marked by political entrenchment, any serious dialogue will focus on two inter-
twined problems associated with putting demand on a sustainable footing so as
to ensure cost-efficient supply. One problem relates to whether European states
can show a modicum of collective political leadership that results in a serious
strategic blueprint; one which gives clearer signals to firms as to the shape and
extent of future demand. The other problem relates to waning investment by
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governments in defence R&D and capability development programmes.
According to Eurostat, for example, total EU27 GBAORD in defence – in terms
of budget provisions and not actual expenditure – decreased from ¼9.7 billion
in 2007 to ¼4.3 billion in 2011 (a decrease of ¼5.4 billion in 4 years).
This short essay lists, in no particular order of preference, five specific but
potentially feasible future work areas that could help address these two issues.
The European Investment Bank
National budgets are unlikely to yield greater resources for military capability
development or for military R&D in the short to medium term. Yet, spending
on defence is a critical hallmark of national sovereignty – indeed, to provide for
defence is the ultimate raison d’être for governments – and so some degree of
budgetary cooperation between Member States (less likely) or some form of
innovation using common funds (potentially feasible) for defence will be
required. To cushion such defence spending shortfalls there has been talk of
using the EU’s structural funds and financial tools where possible to support
SMEs, regional clusters and the development of new technologies such as
unmanned aerial vehicles. While such avenues should be explored, the use of
purely Community mechanisms does raise certain restrictions and political fric-
tions. Indeed, Community-based financial instruments cannot be used for
strictly military purposes; the EU budget will not fund, say, an aircraft carrier
project. Further still, some hesitantly believe that the use of Community funds
will increase the hand of the European Commission in defence policy.
Given these restrictions and political frictions, it is perhaps necessary to think of
other possible avenues for defence-relevant financing. In this regard, little atten-
tion has so far been given to the potential role of the European Investment Bank
(EIB). Indeed, the Bank holds ¼242 billion of available capital and is able to
borrow off of capital markets – in 2012 alone it made loans worth ¼52 billion.
Unlike the EU Budget, and in line with Article 309 of the TFEU, there is no
restriction on the EIB lending to the European defence sector, albeit with one
exception: investments must yield a return. Indeed, utilising EIB loans could
ensure a change of mind-set in the defence sector, as profitable projects would
be underwritten by the EIB; thus reducing inefficiencies and emphasising value
for money. EIB loans could be a lifeline to the EDA – the only EU-level body
actively engaged in military capability development projects – which has seen its
operational budget cut over successive years.
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French-Italian Naval Cooperation
Europe is the world’s largest trading bloc and the continent is dependent on
importing and exporting supplies of goods over the high seas and oceans. Yet,
Europe’s collective naval industrial capacities and capabilities are under pres-
sure. The industrial and strategic competitiveness of Europe’s naval sector is of
the utmost importance. The Commission estimates that there are approximately
150 large shipyards in Europe, with these yards employing around 120,000
people. While certain European states maintain a competitive advantage in the
production and sale of submarines and patrol boats, the costs associated with
the production of naval vessels has risen on the back of increased international
competition, decreased defence spending in Europe, market fragmentation
along national lines, and a lack of coherence in identifying future naval capa-
bility needs. However, any restructuring of Europe’s naval sector must respect
national specificities.
As major exporters of naval equipment, Germany, and with their domestic
demand arrangements, the UK, will not be the obvious standard-bearers of
European naval cooperation. France and Italy – countries facing substantial
challenges, but with experience in cooperation (e.g. the Franco-Italian FREMM
frigate programme) – could assume this responsibility. These governments could
embark on a path that would synchronise procurement cycles and commonly
identify future naval capability needs. Additionally, in tandem with relevant
firms these governments could harmonise naval R&D efforts; ensure the stand-
ardisation of naval systems; exploit naval and civilian shipbuilding sector link-
ages and ensure – by drawing on sustained support from the Commission’s
structural funds – labour restructuring with an emphasis on ensuring a techni-
cally skilled and young workforce.
The “Groups of Directors”
No other group of individuals know the potential for and limitations of capa-
bility development, and how this relates to defence procurement and defence
investments processes, like the individual national Directors for armaments,
capabilities and R&T (“Groups of Directors”). Indeed, these Directors are
tuned-in to the need to deliver equipment programmes to time, budget and func-
tionality and they have the necessary links to firms and relevant national insti-
tutions such as the ministries of defence and finance. The Groups of Directors
can collectively help translate strategic objectives into armament cooperation
initiatives as well as promote interoperability, harmonisation and collaboration
between Member States. They also know their own member state’s red lines and
can pragmatically delineate possible restrictions to cooperation.
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Given the importance of the Groups of Directors, it is odd that they currently
only meet at least twice yearly at the sub-ministerial level under EDA auspices.
Even though their representatives and points of contact are involved in the
policy process on a more day-to-day basis, the Groups of Directors could have
a more prominent role in the development of the EDTIB. Indeed, while the
Groups of Directors are hardwired into the EDA – and they will remain so – they
are largely distant from the policy work that takes place in other EU institutions
responsible for generating capability requirements including: the PSC; the
CMPD; the EUMS and the EUMC. Bodies that identify future military capa-
bility needs and thus generate market demand. The Member States – with the
EDA, Commission and the EEAS – could explore ways to better integrate the
Groups of Directors into the broader defence policy work of the Union.
Security of Supply
It can be reasonably argued that an open economy and transparent procurement
procedures are the most effective means of ensuring security of supply in the
defence sector. Relying on the market to always ensure security of supply is
risky, however. There have been many recent examples of raw material supply
restrictions. Metals such as rare earth elements, titanium and platinum can be
exposed to export restrictions, and such metals are key inputs in European
defence-industrial production processes. The Commission’s recent defence
Communication proposes the monitoring of such metals as part of its Raw
Materials Initiative. This is welcome news and any ideas the Commission has
for recycling or substituting defence-relevant materials should be encouraged.
Indeed, the Commission and EDA could jointly draw up – and revise accord-
ingly – a “critical EDTIB inputs list” on behalf of the EU Member States.
Security of supply is, however, a broader issue than just raw material supplies.
Indeed, technological know-how is also a key pillar of securing the EDTIB – the
loss of know-how to competitors is strategically perilous. Thus, surveillance of
non-EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe’s defence sector, as and when
it can result in potentially harmful foreign ownership of critical defence infra-
structure, is an important issue. Again, the Commission raises this point in the
2013 Communication but action by the Member States is required, especially as
many of them do not currently have sufficient safeguards in place. Lastly, cyber
security is also a growing issue for the defence-industrial supply-chain. To this
end, the EDA and the Commission could be tasked with developing an “ESO
certification” to denote prime and tier firms that actively engage in supply-chain
monitoring and that implement data handling security measures.
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Improve Energy Efficiency
A modern EDTIB should be characterised by initiatives that improve the quality
of Europe’s armed forces in the field, that ensure maximum operational effi-
ciency, that link up firms with government and EU institutions and that draw on
technological advances made in the civilian sector wherever necessary.
Improving the energy efficiency of Europe’s armed forces and ministries of
defence would tick all of these boxes. According to the Commission, Europe’s
militaries are the biggest public consumers of energy in the EU. The EDA
surmises that the armed services of one member state alone consumes as much
electricity as a large city, and that the EDA’s 27 Member States in turn consume
the equivalent of a small EU nation’s electricity usage and spend over ¼1 billion
annually in the process. This is not even to speak of what Europe’s militaries
spend each year on fossil fuels in operational theatres, or what levels of energy
defence firms consume in production processes.
Dependency on fossil fuels in operational theatres is not only costly and bad
for the environment, but it is strategically imprudent given the vulnerabilities
associated with transporting such fuels to the frontline. Greater use of renew-
able energies in the field could improve operational sustainability and
autonomy, even though the introduction of such energies may not immediately
reduce costs. However, energy efficiency in defence does not begin and end
with the armed forces. It should also include the energy efficiency of ministries
of defence; especially as it relates to their substantial land holdings. The EDA
has already initiated projects to increase the use of renewable energies such as
solar power on defence estates, and the Commission has signalled a willingness
to bring to bear its environmental expertise in this field in the future. The
Member States could now press for greater energy efficiency in Europe’s
defence-sector.
Conclusion
The proposed work plans above are in no way an exhaustive list of ways to
ensure the genuine formation and sustainability of an EDTIB. Instead, in-
keeping with the spirit of pragmatism laid-down by European Council President
Herman Van Rompuy when calling for the Defence Council meeting, the
proposed work plans serve merely as some potential areas of future cooperation
– indeed, some of the issues outlined are already on the agenda. Faced with the
critical challenges that have long afflicted the European defence sector, it is too
easy to call for more of that old, mercurial, mantra “political will”. That is, of
course, unless the EU Member States are willing to ultimately swallow some
degree of pride and endure the economic losses that will inevitably come from a
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root and branch restructuring of Europe’s defence markets. Such losses will
come in due course at any rate, but they will be far worse through a purely
national response.
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IF SECURITY MATTERS, INSTITUTIONS MATTER
MARGRIET DRENT
The European Council on Defence of December 2013 should deliver concrete
results and refrain from institutional tinkering. This sentiment seems clearly
reflected in the Commission Communication and the HR report on the CSDP.
These documents breathe a hands-on and pragmatic approach. However, since
an immature and incomplete institutional set up is part of the problem of the
CSDP, institutional reforms cannot be circumvented. In addition, ensuring that
European defence has the capabilities it needs, requires a different take at the role
of the Commission, the EDA and the Council and their competences in gener-
ating these capabilities. And last, but not least, the Treaty of Lisbon does offer
the dearly needed flexibility for a credible defence, so the articles on PESCO, the
start-up fund and flexible cooperation should be addressed. In short, not only
security matters, but in order to reach that security, institutions matter too.
The main issue for the European Council on Defence is arguably the shortage of
the right civilian and military capabilities for the EU to be a security provider
and to have strategic autonomy. The keys to gaining these capabilities against
the backdrop of reduced military budgets is, as mentioned in the Communica-
tion by the Commission, more cooperation and efficient use of resources. This
is not new, neither is it new that the Commission is closing in on the area of
defence in the EU. As both Ashton’s Report and the Commission’s Communica-
tion in preparation of the European Council on Defence have reiterated, the EU
is a security provider. The significance of this phrase is that it does not differen-
tiate between the EU as a provider of security for its citizens by tackling threats
that affect the EU’s security from the outside, but it includes a broader notion of
security, protecting the security and safety of citizens regardless of the origin of
the threat. Although the CSDP is the focus of the European Council, the
increasing blurring of internal and external security does have implications for
the security instruments needed and the institutional make up of the CSDP
within the EU.
The Council on Defence of this December is going to be a next step in the
“communitarisation” of EU defence, slowly but surely hollowing out the exclu-
sivity of defence as a domain of the Member States. The Commission’s role in
further enforcing the 2009 defence Directives to ensure market efficiency is only
one indication of a larger presence of the Commission in EU defence. Further
added value of the Commission stepping into the defence sector is their role in
the standardisation for products that have both civilian and military applica-
tions (so called “hybrid” standards) and making sure that there is a common
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certification of defence products. The Commission (Internal Market & Services,
Enterprise & Industry and Research & Innovation) and the EDA have worked
together from the founding of EDA in 2004. However, increasingly it seems that
the EDA is operating in the shadow of the much larger, more powerful and way
better resourced Commission. The EDA has been functioning with its hands
tied, because Member States have looked to curtail its scope and finances. Now,
the Commission looks better equipped to take on generating capabilities for civil
and military security purposes. Results oriented countries are confronted with
the fact that their Council-Agency EDA is curtailed to the extent that the EU
institution over which the Member States have the least say is gaining influence.
Of great importance in the communitarisation of defence is the opening up of
Commission funds for CSDP-related research. Equally significant is the
proposal for EU-owned dual use capabilities to provide strategic enablers. The
Commission will make a joint assessment, together with the EEAS, on which
dual-use capability needs there are for security and defence policies and come up
with a proposal on which capabilities could be fulfilled by ‘assets directly
purchased, owned and operated by the Union’.31 These could be most useful in
the area of communication, RPAS, helicopters, satellite communication,
imagery and surveillance. Interestingly, the new regulation of the EU Agency for
border management of 2011 also enables this Agency to acquire, lease or
co-own equipment with Member States. In 2013, Frontex launched a pilot
project for leasing equipment. It is notable that in case of co-ownership with a
member state, Frontex’s regulation provides for a “model agreement” in which
modalities will be agreed ensuring the periods of full availability of the co-
owned assets for the Agency. It seems that the 2011 Frontex regulation can be
regarded as a model for how the EU could continue with owning dual-use assets
to provide the whole EU security sector (including defence) with key enablers.
An element which is explicitly mentioned in the Commission’s Communication
is the possibility of the EU-agencies’ involvement in defence policies. This is of
course already happening. Frontex and Europol have been lending their exper-
tise to CSDP-missions such as EULEX Kosovo, EUBAM Moldova and EUBAM
Libya. However, Agencies operating in the broad security area, such as EMSA
(maritime safety), Eurojust (justice cooperation), Europol (police cooperation)
and Frontex often have wider remits, better access to research funds and stricter
commitments of Member States for assets that are mostly also needed by
defence organisations. A closer cooperation, particularly in the area of capabil-
ities, seems logical. All these developments have institutional consequences as
they cross the exclusive and shared competences of the Commission, EU Agen-
31. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a
more competitive and efficient defence and security sector. Brussels, 2013, COM(2013) 542/2, p. 12.
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cies and EEAS institutions. The European Council of December comes too soon
to fully grasp the implications. In the aftermath of the European Council the
political, legal, institutional and practical consequences of the EU as a security
provider in the broad sense needs to be revisited.
Of course, the familiar institutional questions surrounding the CSDP are also on
the table this December. The ability of the EU to anticipate and respond to each
phase of a crisis life-cycle rapidly and comprehensively remains a concern. The
main problem with the EU’s crisis management procedures are that they take
too long. The revised Crisis Management Procedures that were decided on in
June 2013 tackle this to some extent by skipping a number of stages in the
procedure. However, being able to do more and better advanced planning for
future contingencies would increase the EU’s ability to respond quickly. In fact,
every assessment of the CSDP’s Crisis Management Procedures leads to the same
conclusion: a serious, permanent, preferably civilian-military, planning and
conduct capability in Brussels is needed. However, the “H”-word is even more
of a taboo than the “S”-word. The consequences of the taboo are that subop-
timal compromises and small, incremental steps towards strengthening this
capability are taken. One of the results of these compromises is that in March
2012, the OpsCentre was activated for the first time to coordinate the three
CSDP-missions in the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia
and EUCAP Nestor). The OpsCentre in Brussels is staffed by 16 personnel and
functions alongside the multinationalised OHQ for Atalanta in Northwood.
There had to be a first time for activation and the added value it can have for
the comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa is evident, but it is neverthe-
less a meagre result of the Weimar countries’ (plus Spain and Italy) 2011 push
for a permanent OHQ.
In their frustration that the UK did not budge from its position to block a perma-
nent command and control capability the Weimar-countries proposed to acti-
vate a dormant provision from the Treaty of Lisbon: the article on PESCO.
PESCO would have allowed for a bypassing of the British veto, but as it is
clearly in the interest of the EU Member States to keep the UK on board on
defence matters, confrontation on the issue was avoided. The subject of a
permanent planning and conduct capability remains unmentioned in the run up
to the European Council. PESCO is mentioned in HR Ashton’s Report, but in a
very hesitant and ambivalent way. The discouraging words ‘[...] the appetite to
move forward seems limited at this stage’ is followed under the rubric “Way
forward” by the intention to ‘[...] discuss with the Member States their willing-
ness to make full use of […] PESCO’.32 In addition, Ashton revisits in her
32. Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence. Final Report by the High
Representative/Head of EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Brussels, 15 October 2013,
p. 16.
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interim Report articles from the Treaty to facilitate rapid decision-making in
crisis management: Article 44 on entrusting a task to a group of Member States
and Article 41.3 on the creation of a start-up fund.33 Using these Articles could
facilitate willing and able countries to proceed with deploying operations, while
at the same time circumventing bureaucratic hurdles in getting their preparatory
activities financed.
As HR Ashton said in her report: ‘[w]e must move from discussion to delivery’,
but it is not coincidental that “discussion” is often equated with institutional
haggling. Decisions on the institutional set up determine the direction and scope
of the EU as a security provider and are therefore among the most difficult to
take. The European Council should focus on those areas where results can be
expected. At the same time, the institutional range of security and defence
related policies is broadening considerably from the CSDP/EEAS institutions,
but also to EU Agencies and the Commission. This widens the options and
creates opportunities for comprehensive policies, dual-use capability generation
and even Union-owned capabilities. Developing the EU as a security provider
may first and foremost revolve around concrete actions, projects and capabili-
ties, but without using the possibilities of the EU institutional architecture, the
actual delivery will be difficult. Therefore, institutions do matter.
33. Ibid., p. 20.
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